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1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
This dissertation is a collection of three studies that investigate welfare measurement, cau-
sation of addition emission, and effectiveness of policy in environmental economics. The first
study focuses on the discrepancy from different data sources in nonmarket valuation. This study
suggests a new valuation method to solve one common problem shown frequently in combining
RP and SP data. The second study examines the significance of the relation between two
critical concerns, obesity and vehicle emission. This study shows, even though the impact of
obesity on gasoline consumption seems to be significantly large in either one side or aggregate
data level, the significance is ambiguous or the magnitude of impact is not sufficiently large
study after removing unobserved household characteristics using household-level data. The
third study investigates the rebound effect in vehicle use, a critical parameter in cost-benefit
analyses of increases in the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. The following
illustrates the ideas and findings of three chapters contained within this dissertation.
The first study, “Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Data: A Latent Class Ap-
proach,” proposes a new framework to combine revealed and stated preference data when the
convergent validity assumption is not hold.
A substantial literature exists combining data from revealed preference (RP) and stated
preference (SP) sources, aimed either at testing for the convergent validity of the two approaches
used in nonmarket valuation or as a means of drawing on their relative strengths to improve the
ultimate estimates of value. In doing so, it is assumed that convergence of the two elicitation
approaches is an “all or nothing” proposition; i.e., the RP and SP data are either consistent with
each other or they are not. The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative framework
2that allows for possible divergence among individuals in terms of the consistency between their
RP and SP responses. In particular, we suggest the use of the latent class approach to segment
the population into two groups. The first group has RP and SP responses that are internally
consistent, while the remaining group exhibits some form of inconsistent preferences. An EM
algorithm is employed in an empirical application that draws on the moose hunting data set
used in earlier combined RP and SP exercises. The empirical results suggest that somewhat less
than half the sample exhibits inconsistent preferences. We also examine differences in welfare
estimates drawn from the two classes.
The second study, “Does Obesity Matter for the Environment? Evidence from Vehicle
Choices and Usage” studies the interesting link between obesity and vehicle emission, using
unique household-level data.
The rising rate of obesity has become a prominent social concern in the U.S. and through-
out the world. Several recent studies examine how obesity influences households’ driving or
vehicle choice behavior. While the results in prior studies are compelling, the studies suffer
from two shortcomings. First, prior studies rely on aggregate data (national or county level),
rather than individual or household level observations, potentially masking important factors
determining individual choices for vehicles and driving. Second, while previous works able to
establish a link between obesity and vehicle choice or driving, linking vehicle choice, in turn,
to overall emissions requires information regarding vehicle miles driven. The objective of this
study is to address these two limitations, using household observations from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID), jointly modeling the impact of obesity on the vehicle choice and
vehicle miles traveled (VMT). In particular, we investigate the impact of obesity and overweight
by employing both reduced-form (linear panel model) and structural model (joint discrete and
continuous choice model). Our study shows that the prevalence of obesity in 2005 has remained
at the 1981 level, and gasoline consumption would be 3% saved in the reduced-form approach.
While the rate of overweight people in 2005 has remained at the 1981 level, only 1.6% less
gasoline would be demanded using the structural-approach. Our empirical findings suggest
that the comprehensive impact of obesity and overweight on gasoline consumptions is little
or ambiguous in contrast to the results of prior studies considering either driving or vehicle
3choices.
The third study, “Vehicle Fuel Efficiency and the Rebound Effect: Evidence from U.S. Panel
Data” examines the rebound effect of vehicle usage. This study revisits one of the classical
issues in energy economics using U.S. panel data which have never used in this area.
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are a centerpiece of the United
States’ efforts to control mobile source air pollution. In addition to being politically expedient
relative to a more direct gasoline or carbon tax, they may also be more effective as a pol-
icy instrument, if, as the literature suggests, consumers are subject to the so-called “energy
paradox,” undervaluing the fuel cost savings from more fuel efficient vehicles. However, at the
same time, there are also risks associated with CAFE standards. In particular, to the extent
that individuals respond to increased fuel efficiency by driving more, a response known as the
“rebound effect,” the impact of the standards may be significantly diminished. A number of
papers have sought to quantify the rebound effect, but the results have varied substantially. A
key concern with this literature is that it is largely based on cross-sectional data sources, mak-
ing it more difficult to control for the endogeneity of fuel economy. The purpose of this paper
is to address these endogeneity concerns through the use of panel data techniques, drawing on
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In contrast to prior studies using only
cross-sectional data, we find the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with respect to both
fuel economy and fuel price to be statistically significant. Our results show that a 1% increase
in fuel prices or fuel economy (MPG) leads to a 0.41 to 0.67% increase in driving miles. We
also examine heterogeneity of these elasticities across the income deciles. We find evidence that
low income households are more responsive to changes in gasoline prices, but less sensitive to
changes in fuel economy.
1.1.1 Dissertation Organization
The structure of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next three chapters consist
of three independent papers regarding non-market valuation and energy economics, overall
environmental economics. The dissertation closes with an overall summary of our findings and
a general discussion of possible extensions.
4CHAPTER 2. COMBINING REVEALED AND STATED PREFERENCE
DATA: A LATENT CLASS APPROACH
2.1 Introduction
A substantial literature has emerged in the nonmarket valuation arena aimed at combin-
ing data from revealed preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) sources. The goal of such
efforts vary. In some cases, the objective is to test the convergent validity of the RP and SP
approaches [e.g., Azevedo et al. (2003), Huang et al. (1997), and Whitehead et al. (2010)]. In
other instances, the two data sources are viewed as complementary, with RP data providing
values grounded in individual behavior (rather than intentions), while SP data both expands
on the range of variation in environmental amenities from what is observed in RP data and
introduces experimental control over the impact of unobservable factors [e.g., von Haefen and
Phaneuf (2008)]. To the extent that the RP and SP data are generated by the same underlying
preferences, this approach argues that combining the two provides more accurate measures of
value. Early examples along these lines include Cameron (1992) and Adamowicz et al. (1994),
while more recent applications include Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) and Eom and Larson
(2006). In either case, it is typically assumed that convergence between the RP and SP data
sources is an “all or nothing” proposition; i.e., the RP and SP data are either consistent with
each other or they are not. The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative framework
that allows for possible divergence among individuals in terms the consistency between their
RP and SP responses. In particular, we suggest the use of latent class approach to segment
the population into two groups. The first group has RP and SP responses that are internally
consistent, while the remaining group exhibits some form of inconsistent preferences. Examin-
ing differences between the preferences of the two groups provides additional insights into the
5wedge between RP and SP responses. The framework also opens up the possibility of modeling
class membership, along the lines employed by Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), with the goal of
mitigating the behavior of those in the “inconsistent” class in subsequent RP/SP exercises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the literature combining stated and revealed preference data. We then describe the proposed
latent class model in Section 3, along with a description of the EM algorithm used in estimation.
Section 4 presents a generated data experiment to illustrate the performance and characteristics
of the model under different parameterizations, with particular attention paid to the size of the
“inconsistent” class as a share of the population. These Monte Carlo exercises illustrate the
impact, both in terms of parameter and welfare estimates, of ignoring discrepancies between
the underlying RP and SP data generating processes, particularly when the “consistent” class is
only a small share of the target population. We illustrate our framework in Section 5 using the
Moose Hunting data first introduced by Adamowicz et al. (1997) in their RP/SP exercise, and
subsequently employed by von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008). Our results indicate that nearly
a half of the sample provided responses that suggest different RP and SP data generating
processes and that welfare predictions are sensitive to the choice of which subgroup is used in
valuing changes to the environment. The paper wraps up in Section 6 with a summary and
conclusions.
2.2 The Literature on Combining RP/SP Data Sources
The idea of combining information from revealed preference and stated preference sources
is by no means a new one, with papers appearing in the marketing, transportation, health and
environmental economics literatures. In their recent review, Whitehead et al. (2008) note that
the earliest efforts along these lines appeared in the transportation and marketing literatures
nearly twenty-five years ago, with papers by Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990) and Ben-Akiva
et al. (1994). Comparisons between RP- and SP- based welfare measures have, of course,
been around for years in the environmental arena, including the pioneering goose hunting
permit study by Bishop and Heberlein (1979). However, the objective of such comparisons was
typically a convergent validity test, with the usual, though not universal, presumption being
6that the RP results were more reliable as they were based on actual behavior.1
The earliest efforts to explicitly combine the two sources in the environmental literature
appeared somewhat later, with papers by Cameron (1992) and Adamowicz et al. (1994). These
authors argued that RP and SP data should be viewed as complementary, rather than com-
peting, sources of information. In particular, two key limitations of the revealed preference
data are (a) insufficient variation in environmental amenities of interest and (b) the potential
for the environmental amenities to be confounded with other observed or unobserved factors.
Proposed environmental policy scenarios often involve changes that are outside of the range
of historical environmental conditions, making extrapolation of preferences for such changes
tenuous and dependent on strong assumptions regarding the form of individual preferences.
More fundamentally, there may simply not be sufficient historical variation in the environmen-
tal attribute of interest to identify its impact on preferences. A related problem is that what
variation is observed for an environmental amenity may be correlated with other observed or
unobserved factors impacting consumer preferences, making it difficult to disentangle its causal
effect on consumer behavior. Stated preference data, on the other hand, provides the researcher
with greater control over the variation in environmental conditions presented to survey partic-
ipants. In many cases, orthogonal treatments can be employed, though such treatments may
be limited by the need to present realistic choice scenarios. von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008)
highlight the fact that the experimental control associated with stated preference surveys can
be used to isolate the causal impact of an environmental amenity on individual behavioral,
avoiding problems of omitted variables bias encountered in stand-alone RP exercises. Eom and
Larson (2006) illustrate the use of SP data, in combination with RP data, to identify non-use
(or passive use) values that simply cannot be identified with RP data alone.
The major concern with stated preference data sources is that they might be susceptible to
hypothetical bias. Revealed preference data can be used to “discipline” the stated preference
responses with information on choices observed in the marketplace. One strategy is to rely
primarily upon RP data to estimate the key preference parameters, such as the marginal utility
1See Randall (1994) and Azevedo et al. (2003) for alternative perspectives on the presumed reliability of RP
results.
7of income, leaving SP with the role of “filling-out” the marginal impacts of environmental
amenities on individual preferences [e.g., von Haefen and Phaneuf (2003)]. Alternatively, if
both sources are viewed as suspect, combining the two data sources may provide the best
overall picture of consumer preferences.
The evidence regarding combining RP and SP data sources is mixed. Adamowicz et al.
(1994) and Adamowicz et al. (1997), for example, find “. . . RP-SP parameter equality, once
variance heterogeneity is accounted for, and . . . that joint RP-SP models are superior to RP
models alone.” In contrast, von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008), using the same data as Adamowicz
et al. (1997), reject consistency between the RP and SP responses, as do Azevedo et al. (2003)
in a different setting. Both Jeon and Herriges (2010) and Whitehead et al. (2008) reject
consistency between RP and SP responses in their respective studies, though the differences
between the welfare measures derived from the RP and SP sources are not substantial. In
all these studies, the tests for consistency are for the sample as a whole. In the next section,
we outline a latent class model which estimates the proportion of the sample that exhibits
inconsistent RP and SP preferences.
2.3 Model
This section begins by describing a single class joint model of RP and SP data in a repeated
discrete choice setting. The structure of the model is similar to the one employed by von Haefen
and Phaneuf (2008). The model is then extended using a latent class framework, allowing for
some portion of the sample (s) to exhibit consistent RP and SP preferences, while the RP and
SP parameters diverge for the remainder of the sample. As is typical of the recent literature
on latent class models [e.g., Breﬄe et al. (2011); Evans and Herriges (2010); Kuriyama et al.
(2010)], we propose estimating the parameters of the model using of an EM algorithm so as to
avoid numerical difficulties often encounter with standard maximum likelihood estimation of
latent class models [see, e.g., Train (2009)].
82.3.1 Combining RP and SP data
There are two common issues encountered when combining RP and SP recreation demand
data. First, the relevant site attributes are generally different for the two data sources. Of
particular concern in the context of the modeling RP choices is the fact that the analyst may
observe only a subset of the choice attributes impacting an individual’s decision. To the extent
that there are unobserved choice attributes that are correlated with the attributes available to
the researcher, steps must be taken to control for potential omitted variables bias. In contrast,
stated preference choices can be thought of as providing the analyst with complete information
on the relevant choice attributes, assuming of course that the SP study is well-designed and the
respondents fully understand the instructions. To the extent that there are unobservable indi-
vidual or site attributes impacting an individual’s choices, the random assignment of observable
treatment affects should avoid potential omitted variables bias. Second, given the differences
in the decision making processes underlying the RP and SP data sources, there are likely to be
differences in the unobservable factors impacting the corresponding decisions. These differences
manifest themselves in differences between the scale parameters associated with the RP and
SP portions of the model. Control for changes in the scale parameters of the two models is
important in testing for consistency between the two data sources [see, e.g., Adamowicz et al.
(1994) and Adamowicz et al. (1997)].
Starting with the revealed preference portion on the model, the data provide information
on the number of times (nRPij ) individual i chose to visit each of j sites over the course of Ti
trips.2 The utility (URPijt ) that individual i receives from choosing site j on trip t is assumed to
be a linear function of observed (XRPj ) and unobserved (X˜
RP
j ) site specific attributes, travel
costs to the site (pij), and an idiosyncratic error components (µ
RP εijt), where εijt is an iid
2The model specified here is a site selection model, rather than a model that also characterizes the partici-
pation decision, as in the repeated logit framework of Morey et al. (1993). We focus on the site selection aspect
of the individual’s decision to be consistent with the earlier analysis of this same database by Adamowicz et al.
(1997) and von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008).
9Type I extreme value error term and µRP is the associated scale factor.3 Formally,
URPijt = X
RP
j β
RP + X˜RPj β˜
RP + pRPij γ
RP + µRP εijt
= XRPj β
RP + ξRPj + p
RP
ij γ
RP + µRP εijt (2.1)
= αRPj + p
RP
ij γ
RP + µRP εijt (2.2)
= V RPij + µ
RP εijt
where Vij = α
RP
j + p
RP
ij γ
RP , ξRPj ≡ X˜RPj β˜RP and
αRPj ≡ XRPj βRP + ξRPj . (2.3)
Absent any outside information, the impact of the observable factors XRPij on individual choices
cannot be directly disentangle from the impact of the unobservable factors summarized by
ξRPj in equation (2.1). Instead, only the parameters in (2.2) can be estimated, including the
alternatives specific constants (ASC’s) αRPj .
4 However, as suggested by Murdock (2006), a
second stage regression can be use to identify βRP by estimating equation (2.3) using fitted
values for the alternative specific constants (i.e., the αRPj ’s) and properly instrumenting for the
XRPij .
Turning to the stated preference data, the individuals are presented with a series of H
choice scenarios, with each choice scenario involving K alternatives (K = 3 in the Moose
Hunting data set). The utility USPikh that individual i associates with alternative k from choice
scenario c is assumed to be a linear function of the designed characteristics for each of the
choice alternatives (XSPikh), the cost of the presented alternative (pikh), and an idiosyncratic
error components (µSP εikh), where εikh is an iid Type I extreme value error term and µ
SP is
the associated scale factor. Formally
USPikh = X
SP
kh β
SP + pSPikhγ
SP + µSP εikh. (2.4)
There are several features of (2.4) worth noting. First, there are no unobservable factors
associated with the SP choice utilities, except of course those imbedded in the idiosyncratic
3Individual specific characteristics such as age, gender and education can also impact the site utilities, typically
through interactions between individual and site characteristics. For now, we ignore these interaction effects for
the sake of notational simplicity, but incorporate them later in both the Monte Carlo analysis and subsequent
application.
4Of course, only J − 1 ASC’s can be estimated, with one site’s ASC normalized to zero.
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error term. The random assignment of choice characteristics breaks the potential correlation
between the observable treatments and any unobserved factors influencing the individual’s
decision. This is one of the key strengths of the stated preference approach. Second, while URPijt
is constant over the choice alternatives (with, of course, the exception of the idiosyncratic error
term), the utilities associated with the SP choices can vary substantially over the alternative
choice occasions. This is a second key strength of the SP data.
Without further restrictions on the two sources of preference information, neither of the
scale parameters µRP and µSP are identified and must be normalized to 1. The corresponding
contribution of an individual to the likelihood function is then given by:
LICi
(
θIC
)
=

J∏
j=1
[
exp(αRPj + p
RP
ij γ
RP )∑J
m=1 exp(α
RP
m + p
RP
im γ
RP )
]nRPij  (2.5)
·
H∏
h=1
 K∏
k=1
{
exp(XSPikhβ
SP + pSPikhγ
SP )∑K
r=1 exp(X
SP
irhβ
SP + pSPirhγ
SP )
}1SPikh ,
where 1SPikh = 1 if individual i chose alternative k in SP choice scenario h and equals zero
otherwise and θIC ≡ (αRP• , γRP , βSP , γSP ) denotes the parameter of the model, with αRP• ≡
(αRP1 , . . . , α
RP
J−1) denoting the complete vector of ASC’s. The IC subscript (i.e., “inconsistent”)
on the likelihood function is used to indicate that this specification does not impose consistency
between preferences underlying the RP and SP responses.
The insight of von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) is that, by combining the two data sources
and imposing consistency in the underlying data generating processes, portions of the RP
preferences parameters can now be identified. Specifically, assuming that βRP = βSP = βC
and γRP = γSP = γC , the corresponding likelihood function becomes:
LCi
(
θC
)
=

J∏
j=1
[
exp(XRPj β
C + ξCj + p
RP
ij γ
C)∑J
m=1 exp(X
RP
j β
C + ξCj + p
RP
im γ
C)
]nRPij  (2.6)
·
H∏
h=1
 K∏
k=1
{
exp
[
ω(XSPikhβ
C + pSPikhγ
C)
]∑K
r=1 exp
[
ω(XSPirhβ
C + pSPirhγ
C)
]}1SPikh
 .
where ω ≡ µRP /µSP is the ratio of RP and SP scale parameters and θC ≡ (ξC• , γC , βC , ω)
and ξC• ≡ (ξC1 , . . . , ξCJ−1). Note that, unlike in the case when consistency was not imposed, we
can now estimate the composite impact of the unobservable factors (i.e., the ξCj ’s). Also note
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that in imposing consistency we are not requiring that the scale parameter be the same across
the two data sources.
2.3.2 Latent Class Model
The standard approach in the literature is to estimate both the consistent and inconsistent
models (i.e., using the likelihood functions in equations (2.6) and (2.5), respectively) and to
choose between the two specifications based standard tests. The model being proposed in this
paper is to consider an in-between approach, allowing for the possibility that individuals differ
in terms of the consistency of their RP and SP responses. In particular, we adopt latent class
model with two distinct groups: Class C in which individual exhibit consistent preference
parameters across their RP and SP data sources as in depicted in (2.6) and Class IC in which
individuals have disparate RP and SP parameters as depicted in (2.5). Class membership is
not known to the analysts. Therefore, the overall likelihood function (i.e., unconditional on
class membership) for individual i can be formulated as
Li(θ) = sLCi
(
θC
)
+ (1− s)LICi
(
θIC
)
(2.7)
where s ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of being in the consistent class and θ ≡ (θC , θIC , s)
denotes the full set of parameters to be estimated. The class membership probability can be
modeled as a function of individual characteristics, including the individuals socio-demographic
or attitudinal characteristics [see, e.g., Boxall and Adamowicz (2002)]. The advantage of this
approach is that, by understanding the factors that influence membership in the inconsistent
class, researchers may be able target corrective measures to avoid the inconsistencies themselves.
For now, however, we focus on the simpler case is which the probability of class membership is
a constant.
Equation (2.7) can used directly to estimate all of the model’s parameters, including the
class membership probability s, by standard maximum likelihood techniques. However, latent
class models are notoriously difficult to estimate directly. Instead, following the current practice
in the latent class literature [e.g., Morey et al. (2006), Evans and Herriges (2010)], we employ
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an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. The next subsection briefly describes steps
involved in the EM algorithm used in our applications.
2.3.3 EM algorithm
EM algorithms can be useful for maximizing a likelihood function when standard optimiza-
tion procedures can be numerically challenging, which is often the case in the presence of latent
variables and particularly the case in latent class models. In our framework, the latent variable
is class membership ci, which equals C if the individual belongs to the consistent class and
equals IC if the individual belongs to the inconsistent class, with Pr(ci = C) = s.
The EM algorithm is an iterative procedure, alternating between two steps: 1) Calculating
an expectation as a function of the current iteration’s parameter values and 2) maximizing that
expectation with respect to the parameters of the model. Specifically, following the general
notation in chapter 14 of Train (2009), let θt denote the value of the parameters at iteration t.
To maximize (2.7) using the EM algorithm, we define a new function evaluated at θt that can
be used to obtain the parameter vector’s next iteration; i.e., θt+1. Specifically, let
E(θ|θt) ≡
N∑
i=1
{
hCit log
[
sLCi (θC)
]
+ hICit log
[
(1− s)LICi (θIC)
]}
=
N∑
i=1
[
hCit log(s) + h
IC
it log(1− s)
]
+
N∑
i=1
hCit log
[
(LCi (θC)
]
+
N∑
i=1
hICit log
[LICi (θIC)]
(2.8)
where s is the share of the population in class C and hcit denotes the probability of membership
in class c (c = C, IC) conditional on the individual’s observed choices. Using Bayes rule:
hcit = h(ci = c|y•, st) =
stLci (θc)
stLCi (θC) + (1− st)LICi (θIC)
(2.9)
where y• denotes the full set of choices (i.e., the nRPij ’s and 1
SP
ikh’s). Forming this expectation
represents the first step in the EM algorithm.
The second step involves maximizing E(θ|θt) with respect to θ. Conveniently, as can be seen
in equation (2.8), E(θ|θt) is separable into three distinct components that can be independently
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maximized. In particular, maximizing E(θ|θt) with respect to s corresponds to maximizing
E(s|θt) =
N∑
i=1
[
hCit log(s) + h
IC
it log(1− s)
]
, (2.10)
yielding
st+1 =
∑N
i=1 h
C
it∑N
i=1(h
C
it + h
IC
it )
. (2.11)
Maximizing E(θ|θt) with respect to θc (c = C, IC) corresponds to maximizing
E(θc|θt) =
N∑
i=1
hcit log [(Lci (θc)] , (2.12)
which is just class-specific maximum likelihood estimation using hcit as weights. The updated
parameters (i.e., θct+1) are the corresponding solutions to these maximizations; i.e.,
θct+1 = argmax
θc
N∑
i=1
hcit log [(Lci (θc)] . (2.13)
Thus, the steps for estimation of the latent class model using the EM algorithm are
1. Specify initial values for the share and coefficients in each class. We set s0 = 0.5 and
obtain θc0 for class using unweighted maximum likelihood for that class.
2. Calculate the probability of being in each class conditional on the observed choices using
(2.9).
3. Update the share of class C using (2.11).
4. Update the parameters of each class by estimating weighted MLE using (2.13)
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until convergence.
2.4 Generated Data Experiments
In this section, we describe a series of generated data experiments designed to illustrate
the latent class model introduced in Section 3. Particular attention is paid to the performance
of the model given different sample sizes and the proportion of the population belonging to
the consistent class, as well as the impact of erroneously assuming that this class proportion is
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either zero or 1. Throughout, the pseudo-data sets were structured so as to mimic the general
structure of the data set used in the application in Section 5.
As described in previous section, each individual is assumed to belong to either the con-
sistent class (ci = C) or inconsistent class (ci = IC), with Pr(ci = C) = s. Using a slight
generalization of the model from the previous section (i.e., incorporating interactions between
site and individual characteristics), the RP and SP conditional utilities for individuals belonging
to the consistent class are assumed to take the form:
URPijt = X
RP
j β
C + ZiX
RP
j ρ
C + pRPij γ
C + ξj + µ
RP εijt (2.14)
USPikh = X
SP
k β
C + ZiX
SP
k ρ
C + pSPik γ
C + µSP εikh
where Zi denotes an individual characteristics such as age, gender or education. On the other
hand, for individuals belongs to the inconsistent class, these conditional utilities are assumed
to take the form:
URPijt = X
RP
j β
RP + ZiX
RP
j ρ
RP + pRPij γ
RP + ξj + µ
RP εijt (2.15)
USPikh = X
SP
k β
SP + ZiX
SP
k ρ
SP + pSPik γ
SP + µSP εikh
In the generated data experiments, we consider a total of 15 scenarios varying the scenarios
along two dimensions:
1. The probability of membership in the consistent class, with s ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9};
and
2. The number of observations, with N ∈ {200, 500, 1000}.
In all of the scenarios, the number of alternatives available on each choice occasion is fixed in
the RP and SP settings, with J = 20 and K = 3, respectively. The corresponding total number
of choice occasions are likewise fixed for the RP and SP settings, with T = 10 and H = 15,
respectively. Finally, for each scenario, 100 generated data sets were constructed.
The specific steps used to generate data sets are as follows:
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1. The vector of individual characteristics (Zi), site characteristics (Xj), and travel costs
(pij) were drawn from the following distribution:
Zi ∼ N(0, 1)
XRPj ∼ N(0, 1)
XSPk ∼ N(0, 2)
pRPij ∼ logN(0, 1)
pSPik ∼ logN(0, 2)
ξj ∼ N(−2, 0.05)
2. Each individual in the sample was then randomly assigned to either the consistent class
(i.e., ci = C) or the inconsistent class (i.e., ci = IC), with Pr(ci = C) = s.
3. Depending upon the class to which they were assigned, either equations (2.14) or equa-
tions (2.15) were then used to generate the conditional utilities URPijt and U
SP
ikh for each
choice occasion and alternative employing the following parameters:
• βC = −2.0;
• ρC = −3.0;
• γC = −0.8; and
• ω = 0.4
for the consistent class and
• βRP = −1.2;
• ρRP = −0.7;
• γRP = −1.8;
• βSP = −0.6;
• ρSP = −0.5; and
• γSP = −0.4.
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for the inconsistent class. For both classes, the error terms (i.e., εijt’s and εikh’s) were
drawn from the Type I extreme value distribution.
4. Given the conditional utilities URPijt and U
SP
ikh for each choice occasion, the individual’s
choices (i.e., 1RPijt and 1
SP
ikh) were then determined by the alternative yielding the highest
utility.
For each generated sample, we estimate three different models:
• Model 1 : The latent class model described in Section 4 and based on the likehood function
in equation (2.7);
• Model 2 : The fully inconsistent model based on the likelihood function in equation (2.5);
and
• Model 3 : The fully consistent model based on the likelihood function in equation (2.6).
We then compare and contrast the three models in terms of the implied welfare impact from
closing the most popular site in the sample.
Table 2.1 summarizes the resulting parameter estimates for Model 1.5 In particular, for
each scenario (i.e., combination of s and N), the table reports the mean parameter estimates
across the 100 replications, as well as the corresponding 5th and 95th percentile values. Since
Model 1 is consistent with the underlying data generating process, it is not surprising that
the mean parameter estimates are generally quite close to the true parameters. However, the
estimates are less stable when the share of individuals in the consistent class (i.e., s) is quite
small. This is to be expected since the estimation then relies on relatively few individuals to
identify the parameters for the consistent class. Somewhat unexpected is the fact that the
parameter estimates are not as varied at the other extreme (i.e., when s = 0.9).
Parameter estimates using the other two models (i.e., Models 2 and 3), are provided in
Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. Since these models are not consistent with the
5Estimates for the alternative specific constants αRPj and ξ
C
j are not reported in Table 2.1 for the sake of
space, but are available from the authors upon request. Also, estimates for the parameters βRP are obtained
through a second stage regression based on the fitted alternative specific constants from the first stage and using
the relationship in (2.3).
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underlying data generating process, it is not surprising that they tend to yield greater depar-
tures from the underlying parameters of the model. In general, Model 2 performs relatively
well when most of the population is drawn from the inconsistent class (e.g. s = 0.1), whereas
Model 3 performs relatively well when most of the population is drawn from the consistent
class (e.g., s = 0.9).
Perhaps more important than the performance of a model in terms of individual parameter
estimates is its performance in estimating the welfare impacts of a proposed policy scenario.
Table 2 summarizes the performance of the three models in terms of estimating the average
welfare impact of two policy scenarios:
• Scenario A: Closure of site 1.
• Scenario B : Improvement in site quality for alternative 1. This corresponds to a fifty
percent reduction in XRP1 .
For the latent class model (i.e., Model 1), the appropriate welfare measure is a weighted average
of the compensating variation from the consistent and inconsistent class models, with the
weights being the corresponding class probabilities; i.e.,
CV = s× CV C + (1− s)CV RP (2.16)
where s is the probability of being in the consistent class, with CV C and CV RP denote the
standard log-sum calculations based on the consistent class and inconsistent class RP parameter
estimates, respectively.
In contrast, the standard approaches in the literature are to either not impose consistency
across the RP and SP data source (as in Model 2), computing compensating variation based
on the RP parameter estimates, or to impose consistency for all individuals (as in Model 3),
computing compensating variation based on the constrained parameter estimates derived from
the two data sources.
Table 2.2 summarizes the mean absolute percentage errors (MAPE) associated with these
three approaches, i.e.
MAPE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣True Welfare Lossi −Welfare Loss EstimatesiTrue Welfare Lossi
∣∣∣∣ (2.17)
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For all six experiments, the MAPEs are generally lowest for the latent class model (i.e.,
Model 1), which should be the case since it is in accord with the underlying data generating
process. For Scenario A (the closure of site 1), the MAPE’s from the latent class model lie
between 5% and 12%, with the errors diminishing as the available sample size increases. The
errors are larger for both single class specifications.
The MAPE’s are substantially larger for Scenario B, ranging from approximately 10 percent
when N = 1000 and s = 0.5 to over 70 percent when N = 200 and s = 0.10. This pattern is
not surprising. The larger errors for Scenario B are expected, since welfare calculation in this
case depends crucially on estimates of βRP , which are obtained from a second stage regression
of only J = 20 site alternative specific constants on site attributes XRPj . The MAPE’s are
uniformly smallest for the latent class model when s = 0.5, with the population evenly divided
between the inconsistent and consistent classes, effectively providing a more balanced bases
for estimating the underlying class parameters. In contrast, when s = 0.1, only 10 percent of
the sample is assumed to be from the consistent class, providing little information for gleaning
the parameters of that class. As was the case for Scenario A, Scenario B generally yields
higher MAPE’s for the single class specifications. The consistent class model performs best
as the proportion of individuals in the consistent class is largest (i.e., s = 0.9), whereas the
inconsistent class model performs best as the portion of individuals in the inconsistent class is
largest (i.e., s = 0.1).
2.5 Application
2.5.1 Data
To illustrate our proposed latent class model, we reconsider the Moose Hunting data used by
both Adamowicz et al. (1994) and von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) to examine the potential for
combining RP and SP data sources. The data for this study was collected from a sample of 422
individuals drawn from moose hunting license holders living in the Canadian towns of Drayton
Valley, Edson, Hinton, Edmonton, and Whitecourt. Individuals were initially contacted by
mail, with a follow-up phone call inviting them to attend a meeting. Of the 422 hunters
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initially contacted, 312 individuals (74%) agreed to attend the meeting. Of the 312 hunters
who confirmed attendance, 271 (87%) actually attended the meeting.6
The study provides both revealed preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) data. The
RP data consists of reported moose hunting trips to 14 wildlife management units (WMUs)
during 1992, as well as respondent socio-demographic characteristics. SP data takes the form of
a choice experiment in which each respondent was presented with a series of 16 choice scenarios
(i.e., H = 16) each including three alternatives (i.e., K = 3), with two of the alternatives in-
volving hypothetical sites while the third alternative was an opt-out (i.e., not hunting) option.7
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for both individual and site characteristics.The mean
age of hunters in the sample was just under forty years, and they had an average of about 20
years of general hunting experience and about 16 years of experience hunting moose. More
than half of hunters completed high school and most of them reported incomes in the ranges
of $20,000 to $60,000. For both real (RP) and hypothetical (SP) sites, the alternatives are
defined in terms of six attributes: travel cost, moose population, level of congestion, access
within hunting area (no trail, cutlines or seismic lines), quality of road and the presence of
forest activity (logging).
2.5.2 Results
A total of four models were estimated using the Moose Hunting data:
1. SC-Consistent : A single class (SC) model imposing consistency across the RP and SP
data sources;
2. SC-RP : A single class model of preferences based only on the RP data;
3. SC-SP : A single class model of preferences based only on the SP data;
4. LC : A latent class model with a portion s belonging to the consistent class (denoted
LC-Consistent) and a portion (1−s) belong to the inconsistent class (denoted by LC-RP
and LC-SP for the revealed and stated preference components, respectively).
6See McLeod et al. (1993) for additional details regarding the sampling and data collecting procedures.
7In empirical setting, we include dummy variable for ‘not hunting’ (SP dummy) to capture impact of the
opt-out option.
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide the resulting parameter estimates. Table 4 focuses on the core
parameters; i.e., the class share s in the case of the latent class model, the relative RP/SP
scale parameter ω identified only when consistency is imposed for a class, and the travel cost
parameters (i.e., the γ’s). Table 2.5 reports the main effect of site characteristics (i.e, the β’s)
and interactions between site characteristics and individual attributes (i.e., the ρ’s).8
Starting with Table 2.4, the latent class model indicates that the population is roughly
evenly divided between the consistent and inconsistent classes, with s = 0.53. Both the single
and latent class models indicate a significant difference in scales between the RP and SP
responses, with ω in the range of 0.18 to 0.22. This indicates that there is greater variability
in the unobservable components of individual preferences in the case of SP data relative to RP
data (i.e.; µRP < µSP ). Finally, while all of the specifications yield negative and statistically
significant travel cost coefficient, the γ’s vary substantially. Cross-model comparisons of the
estimated γ’s is difficult, since the scale parameter differences between the RP and SP models
cannot be estimated when consistency is not imposed. However, it does appear as though the
latent class structure highlights the gap between consistent and inconsistent preferences. In
particular, the marginal utility of income (−γ) is largest when it is imposed for only a portion
of the population, rather than for the population as a whole. Or, to put it another way, the
consistent class appears to consist of individuals whose choices are substantially influenced by
price.
Turning to Table 2.5, note that there are two sets of parameters being presented. The first
column of parameters are the main effects associated with the site characteristics; i.e., the β’s
in equation (1). For those models involving only the RP data, the β’s can generally only be
recovered in a second stage regression using the estimated ASC’s (i.e., the αj ’s) and equation
(3).9 However, with J = 20, the main effects for the eleven site characteristics used by von
Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) cannot be reasonably estimated and are not reported here. The
second set of parameters are the ρ’s in equation (14), reflecting interactions between individual
8The parameter estimates reported here for the single class models have the same signs and are similar in
magnitude to those reported in von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008), though the specifications differ in that von
Haefen and Phaneuf incorporate a mixed logit structure.
9One exception is the main effect for the “unpaved” site access, since this characteristic varies across sites
and individuals because individuals choose different roads to assess the sites.
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and site characteristics. In general, these parameters vary substantially across the various RP
and SP specifications, often changing signs and significance. The pattern of these parameters
for the single class models are similar to those reported in von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008).
Interpreting the individual parameters in Table 5 is difficult. In order to illustrate the dif-
ferences across the various models, we consider their implications in terms of welfare estimates
for three specific scenarios employed by von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) :
• Case 1: Closer site WMU #344.
• Case 2: Decrease moose population from more than 4 per day to 3-4 per day at WMU
#348.
• Case 3: Increase moose population from less than 1 per day to 1-2 moose per day at
WMU #344.
We assume fixed coefficients within a class we can use standard log-sum term for computing
welfare change. Formally, we can write the deterministic component of utility as following;
Vijt = V (Xj , Qj ; θ)
= (β0 + Ziβ1)Xj +Qjβq + pijγ (2.18)
where Qj denotes moose population at site j, and pij denotes travel costs from household’s
residence to site j, and Xj and Zi represent the other site attributes and sociodemographic vari-
ables respectively. Compensating variation (CV) associated with a change of moose population
from Q0j to Q
1
j is
CVh(β
h) =
1
βp
log
 J∑
j=1
exp
[
V (Xj , Q
1
j ; θ
h)
]− log
 J∑
j=1
exp
[
V (Xj , Q
0
j ; θ
h)
] for h = C, ICRP, ICSP
(2.19)
From (2.19), we can estimate three values of CV for latent class model, i.e. CV using
estimates of consistent class, estimates of RP of inconsistent class, and SP of inconsistent
class. Therefore, we consider two alternative strategies for construction welfare measure. The
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first strategy is to use CV of only consistent class. In this case, we consider individuals who
responded same way between RP and SP as the respondents who said truthful preference. The
second is to adopt weighted average of two values shown in (2.16).
Table 2.6 shows the results of welfare analysis. Although the estimates for case 1 are not
qualitatively quite different, the estimate of combined model is slightly larger (in absolute sense)
than only consistent class, however, smaller than weighted estimated with both RP and SP.
Welfare results for case 2 and case 3 also have similar patterns to case 1.10
2.6 Conclusion
Revealed preference data (RP) are based on actual choices of respondents while stated
preference data (SP) are collected in experimental or survey situations. Therefore, both have
obvious advantages and limitations. The advantage of RP data is that they are the collection of
real choices, which reflect their budget constraint and other variables. However, since they rely
on historical data, variation of alternative attributes is limited and it makes difficult to analyze
new policy beyond currently existing status. While SP data have much variation relying on
experimental design, they obviously have hypothetical bias. To mitigate the limitations and
get advantages from both data, combining revealed and stated preference data is common in
recent environmental economics, marketing and transportation literature. Moreover, the data
make it easy to estimate models with unobserved attributes without depending on additional
econometric technique such as Murdock’s two-stage estimation.
It, however, relies on underlying assumption that both data have common data-generating
process. In other words, both data must have same coefficients. However, the assumption was
often rejected in previous studies [Jeon and Herriges (2010), von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008)].
Combined RP/SP strategy is still used to compute welfare analysis in some prior studies due to
strong points relative to either RP or SP data model even when the assumption is not satisfied.
Although previous literature proposed to selectively use the parameter estimates from several
different models using single data, it is ad hoc or implicitly rely on cross-equation restriction.
10For case 2 and 3, welfare estimates cannot be recovered since there is no variable estimates for the site
attributes, i.e. no mean effect.
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The purpose of this paper has been to introduce an alternative framework for combining
revealed and stated preference data. The literature typically considers only two possible sce-
narios: either respondent’s behaviors in RP and SP are consistent for everyone or they are
consistent for no one. In this paper, we suggest a middle ground, using latent class approach
to segment the population into two groups. The first group has RP and SP responses that are
internally consistent, while the remaining group exhibits some form of inconsistent preferences.
Moreover, as usual latent class model, we propose EM algorithm which is an iterative procedure
to converge maximum likelihood estimation due to the numerical difficulty in empirical study.
We illustrated in our generated data experiments that ignoring discrepancy between real and
hypothetical choices makes huge biases in estimating parameters and welfare analysis while our
method shows much small bias. It implies that our method takes advantages from combining
two data and controls convergent validity assumption as well.
Our empirical application, using moose hunting data in Alberta, Canada, provides evidences
of heterogeneity from the individual’s propensity to show differences between RP and SP data.
As previous study [von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008)] using same data we used in current study
pointed out explicitly that the convergent validity assumption are not satisfied, our proposed
model also shows almost half of individuals responds different ways between RP and SP data.
This difference makes different parameter estimates between two classes. Obviously, our model
results in different welfare estimates to combined single class RP/SP model for several different
welfare loss or gain scenarios. Our results imply that ignoring heterogeneous responses in two
data source can mislead welfare analysis.
There is an unresolvable question which one of two latent class model estimates is better
than the other. Even though weighted averages with RP show small error in our experiments,
we suggest that researchers and policy makers choose either one based on empirical data. As
mentioned in von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008), RP data usually have not enough variations
which make a difficulty in estimation specially in the presence of unobservable. On the other
hand, SP data has the limitations that they may behave differently in real trips. Therefore,
in case that RP data have abundant variations and there is no identification problems, we
recommend to use weighted RP estimates, otherwise weighted SP estimates.
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Table 2.1 Generated Data Experiments - Model 1 Parameter Estimates
TRUE TRUE N=200 N=500 N=1000
Class Parameter s values Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
s
0.10 0.10 0.24 0.06 0.89 0.19 0.07 0.89 0.21 0.07 0.90
0.25 0.25 0.31 0.19 0.75 0.30 0.20 0.72 0.28 0.23 0.61
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.58 0.50 0.45 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.54
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.78
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.92
ω
0.10 0.40 0.38 0.22 0.56 0.38 0.24 0.49 0.38 0.24 0.45
0.25 0.40 0.39 0.26 0.49 0.39 0.24 0.45 0.39 0.35 0.43
0.50 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.42
0.75 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.41
0.90 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.41
Consistent βC
0.10 -2.00 -2.24 -3.35 -1.43 -2.16 -2.74 -1.58 -2.10 -2.74 -1.69
0.25 -2.00 -2.05 -2.61 -1.59 -2.05 -2.61 -1.73 -2.02 -2.24 -1.83
0.50 -2.00 -2.01 -2.32 -1.75 -2.01 -2.18 -1.82 -1.99 -2.12 -1.87
0.75 -2.00 -2.01 -2.25 -1.77 -2.01 -2.15 -1.86 -2.00 -2.09 -1.91
0.90 -2.00 -2.01 -2.24 -1.81 -2.00 -2.14 -1.88 -2.01 -2.10 -1.92
Inconsistent
βRP
0.10 -1.20 -1.29 -2.06 -1.03 -1.24 -1.90 -1.05 -1.30 -1.99 -1.10
0.25 -1.20 -1.23 -1.76 -0.90 -1.21 -1.98 -0.79 -1.22 -1.39 -1.06
0.50 -1.20 -1.21 -1.47 -1.04 -1.19 -1.34 -1.08 -1.21 -1.33 -1.09
0.75 -1.20 -1.33 -2.27 -1.10 -1.21 -1.36 -1.08 -1.22 -1.36 -1.11
0.90 -1.20 -1.82 -3.48 -1.00 -1.32 -1.98 -1.00 -1.24 -1.45 -1.05
βSP
0.10 -0.60 -0.62 -0.89 -0.53 -0.62 -0.81 -0.57 -0.62 -0.80 -0.57
0.25 -0.60 -0.61 -0.78 -0.53 -0.61 -0.74 -0.53 -0.61 -0.66 -0.56
0.50 -0.60 -0.60 -0.70 -0.53 -0.60 -0.65 -0.57 -0.60 -0.63 -0.57
0.75 -0.60 -0.61 -0.75 -0.50 -0.61 -0.69 -0.55 -0.60 -0.66 -0.56
0.90 -0.60 -0.64 -0.91 -0.44 -0.61 -0.73 -0.48 -0.61 -0.69 -0.54
Consistent γC
0.10 -3.00 -2.48 -4.19 -0.70 -2.64 -3.58 -0.77 -2.64 -3.30 -0.75
0.25 -3.00 -2.71 -3.47 -0.80 -2.73 -3.24 -0.89 -2.85 -3.15 -1.32
0.50 -3.00 -2.94 -3.32 -2.61 -2.95 -3.19 -2.81 -2.98 -3.11 -2.87
0.75 -3.00 -3.01 -3.21 -2.76 -3.01 -3.17 -2.88 -2.99 -3.09 -2.90
0.90 -3.00 -3.02 -3.20 -2.82 -3.01 -3.16 -2.89 -3.00 -3.10 -2.92
Inconsistent
γRP
0.10 -0.70 -1.00 -3.29 -0.64 -0.93 -2.94 -0.66 -1.02 -3.02 -0.67
0.25 -0.70 -0.88 -2.80 -0.62 -0.88 -3.03 -0.65 -0.80 -1.26 -0.67
0.50 -0.70 -0.73 -1.25 -0.61 -0.73 -0.80 -0.64 -0.71 -0.76 -0.66
0.75 -0.70 -0.71 -0.88 -0.54 -0.69 -0.78 -0.61 -0.71 -0.78 -0.65
0.90 -0.70 -0.73 -1.12 -0.35 -0.72 -0.89 -0.59 -0.72 -0.84 -0.61
γSP
0.10 -0.50 -0.64 -1.27 -0.46 -0.59 -1.22 -0.47 -0.60 -1.27 -0.48
0.25 -0.50 -0.59 -1.25 -0.46 -0.57 -1.18 -0.47 -0.54 -0.92 -0.48
0.50 -0.50 -0.53 -0.80 -0.43 -0.52 -0.58 -0.46 -0.51 -0.54 -0.47
0.75 -0.50 -0.50 -0.63 -0.36 -0.50 -0.57 -0.44 -0.50 -0.54 -0.45
0.90 -0.50 -0.52 -0.72 -0.33 -0.51 -0.61 -0.40 -0.50 -0.57 -0.45
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Table 2.1: Generated Data Experiments - Model 1 Parameter Estimates (cont’d)
TRUE TRUE N=200 N=500 N=1000
Class Parameter s values Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
Consistent ρC
0.10 -0.80 -1.05 -1.86 -0.63 -0.94 -1.77 -0.66 -0.94 -1.77 -0.73
0.25 -0.80 -0.90 -1.73 -0.70 -0.89 -1.76 -0.72 -0.85 -1.23 -0.76
0.50 -0.80 -0.81 -0.95 -0.73 -0.81 -0.86 -0.75 -0.80 -0.84 -0.77
0.75 -0.80 -0.80 -0.88 -0.74 -0.80 -0.84 -0.77 -0.80 -0.83 -0.77
0.90 -0.80 -0.80 -0.86 -0.75 -0.80 -0.83 -0.77 -0.80 -0.83 -0.77
Inconsistent
ρRP
0.10 -1.80 -1.67 -1.92 -0.92 -1.69 -1.86 -0.83 -1.66 -1.84 -0.78
0.25 -1.80 -1.73 -1.94 -0.89 -1.72 -1.86 -0.89 -1.75 -1.85 -1.57
0.50 -1.80 -1.79 -1.98 -1.62 -1.79 -1.90 -1.70 -1.80 -1.86 -1.74
0.75 -1.80 -1.83 -2.08 -1.63 -1.80 -1.93 -1.69 -1.81 -1.92 -1.71
0.90 -1.80 -1.79 -2.20 -1.29 -1.83 -2.05 -1.67 -1.83 -2.05 -1.67
ρSP
0.10 -0.40 -0.39 -0.44 -0.31 -0.39 -0.42 -0.34 -0.39 -0.42 -0.32
0.25 -0.40 -0.39 -0.43 -0.33 -0.39 -0.43 -0.34 -0.39 -0.42 -0.36
0.50 -0.40 -0.40 -0.45 -0.35 -0.40 -0.43 -0.36 -0.40 -0.42 -0.38
0.75 -0.40 -0.40 -0.48 -0.33 -0.40 -0.45 -0.36 -0.40 -0.43 -0.37
0.90 -0.40 -0.42 -0.53 -0.28 -0.40 -0.48 -0.33 -0.40 -0.46 -0.35
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Table 2.2 Generated Data Experiments: Welfare Performance of Model
Class Ratio Latent Class Single Class
Scenario N (s) Weighted Consistant Inconsistent
A
200 0.10 10.11 21.64 44.49
0.25 11.82 29.99 38.46
0.50 11.69 35.88 32.42
0.75 11.14 28.12 30.61
0.90 11.79 17.23 32.56
500 0.10 7.07 19.90 45.04
0.25 7.50 28.42 39.31
0.50 6.68 34.56 33.84
0.75 7.75 29.47 30.93
0.90 7.63 16.26 32.34
1000 0.10 4.90 19.20 46.44
0.25 4.94 26.57 40.44
0.50 5.35 32.81 34.70
0.75 5.45 25.90 32.69
0.90 5.28 13.99 34.00
B
200 0.10 70.37 128.93 56.16
0.25 65.26 401.35 68.26
0.50 21.37 60.02 75.25
0.75 24.30 54.80 96.97
0.90 29.00 32.91 109.65
500 0.10 36.24 118.71 56.37
0.25 35.74 92.42 65.99
0.50 14.03 141.91 78.15
0.75 27.42 274.40 190.96
0.90 14.60 27.67 109.58
1000 0.10 30.72 110.55 56.81
0.25 13.08 81.49 66.47
0.50 9.50 88.28 74.95
0.75 10.11 67.33 123.67
0.90 12.78 24.34 248.24
30
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Socioeconomic Age (year) 39.63 10.71 18 70
Attributes Income ($) 51,722 22,809 10,000 110,000
Total number of trip 3.62 5.68 0 41
General hunting experience (year) 20.19 10.24 2 51
Moose hunting experience (year) 16.88 9.87 1 49
Edmonton resident dummya 0.45 0.48 0 1
High school diploma dummy 0.91 0.27 0 1
Site Attributes Travel cost ($) 219.71 101.69 88.64 558.92
Moose population(effects coded)b
less than 1 moose per day 0.14 0.52 -1 1
1-2 moose per day 0.5 0.63 -1 1
3-4 moose per day 0.07 0.46 -1 1
a Edmonton is unique urban region in this data set, which is relatively far from hunting area.
b Seeing or hearing moose or seeing fresh sign such as tracks browse or droppings. McLeod et al. (1993)
Table 2.4 Core Parameter Estimates
Parameter Model Est. t-stat
Class Share (s) Latent Class (LC) 0.53 11.6
RP/SP Scale (µ) Single Class (SC) - Consistent 0.22 6.68
LC-Consistent 0.18 10.57
Travel Cost SC-Consistent -1.65 -6.97
SC-RP -1.51 -22.24
SC-SP -0.42 -28.59
LC-Consistent -3.57 -14.1
LC-RP -1.02 -6.73
LC-SP -0.34 -9.00
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Table 2.5 Parameter Estimates for Site Characteristics
Main Interaction Effect
Gen Hunt Exp Edmonton HS diploma
Parameter Model Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Unpaveda SC-Consistent 0.41 0.70 -1.19 -0.71 0.51 1.98 -0.45 -0.97
SC-RP 0.79 2.14 -1.05 -2.26 0.00 0.00 -0.83 -2.37
SC-SP -0.02 -0.08 -0.33 -0.84 0.11 1.70 0.04 0.20
LC-Consistent -0.35 -0.11 -2.34 -1.52 0.83 1.28 0.50 0.15
LC-RP 2.13 0.20 0.76 0.25 -0.01 0.00 -3.61 -0.34
LC-SP -0.19 -0.14 0.37 0.31 0.08 0.54 0.10 0.08
No Trail SC-Consistent -1.73 -0.89 0.44 0.16 -1.93 -3.17 1.44 0.75
SC-RP - - 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.21 0.00
SC-SP -0.38 -1.28 0.02 0.05 -0.45 -5.52 0.33 1.22
LC-Consistent 0.49 0.05 -0.93 -0.20 -4.28 -4.54 0.19 0.02
LC-RP - - -0.77 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.87 0.00
LC-SP -1.03 -0.52 1.04 0.70 -0.25 -1.00 0.53 0.28
Old Trail SC-Consistent 1.12 0.96 -1.95 -1.12 1.89 4.26 0.01 0.01
SC-RP -2.00 0.00 1.28 0.00 0.40 0.00
SC-SP 0.17 0.57 0.12 0.20 0.15 1.65 0.12 0.55
LC-Consistent 0.70 0.17 -5.40 -2.45 4.41 9.00 0.05 0.01
LC-RP - - 3.22 2.00 0.03 0.09 -5.49 -5.20
LC-SP 0.50 0.27 -0.49 -0.33 -0.24 -1.12 0.27 0.15
4WD Trail SC-Consistent 0.65 0.88 1.76 0.94 0.20 0.54 -0.50 -0.85
SC-RP - - 2.06 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.23 0.00
SC-SP 0.32 1.21 0.07 0.13 0.20 2.38 -0.30 -1.30
LC-Consistent -0.84 -0.16 6.89 2.99 -0.32 -0.53 0.36 -0.53
LC-RP - - -5.53 0.00 1.02 0.00 11.09 0.00
LC-SP 0.83 0.53 -0.84 -0.66 0.24 1.28 -0.60 -0.41
No Hunters SC-Consistent 2.61 2.29 -3.57 -1.55 -0.12 -0.27 1.10 1.31
SC-RP - - -0.75 0.00 0.52 0.00 -0.10 0.00
SC-SP 0.56 2.37 -0.79 -1.36 0.04 0.40 0.24 1.18
LC-Consistent 1.19 0.12 -1.07 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 2.95 0.31
LC-RP - - -2.49 0.00 0.39 0.00 3.18 0.00
LC-SP 1.09 0.59 -1.69 -1.04 0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.02
On ATV SC-Consistent -0.93 -1.31 0.39 0.22 0.91 2.76 -0.73 -1.25
SC-RP - - -1.49 0.00 1.05 0.00 -0.19 0.00
SC-SP -0.38 -1.34 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.99 0.05 0.18
LC-Consistent -0.19 -0.03 2.07 0.62 1.61 2.58 -2.04 -0.36
LC-RP - - -4.97 0.00 0.78 0.00 6.34 0.00
LC-SP -1.15 -0.54 1.51 0.85 0.11 0.52 0.47 0.22
No logging SC-Consistent -0.21 -0.61 1.57 1.13 0.10 0.39 0.03 0.13
SC-RP - - 1.81 3.22 -0.41 -2.52 0.00 0.01
SC-SP 0.05 0.29 0.31 1.09 0.01 0.17 -0.09 -0.48
LC-Consistent -0.08 -0.02 3.55 3.84 -0.05 -0.16 -0.53 -0.12
LC-RP - - -7.78 -1.76 -1.50 -2.37 10.90 2.14
LC-SP 0.27 0.16 -0.45 -0.49 0.00 0.01 -0.12 -0.07
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Table 2.5: Parameter Estimates for Site Characteristics (cont’d)
Main Interaction Effect
Gen Hunt Exp Edmonton HS diploma
Parameter Model Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
< 1 Moose SC-Consistent -5.94 -5.41 1.64 1.08 -0.04 -0.10 0.13 0.32
SC-RP - - 1.68 2.45 0.26 1.29 0.46 1.05
SC-SP -1.00 -2.97 -0.24 -0.45 -0.03 -0.34 -0.19 -0.62
LC-Consistent -7.37 -2.29 2.97 1.20 -2.10 -2.05 -0.77 -0.24
LC-RP - - 1.49 0.56 6.10 0.00 3.95 0.47
LC-SP -1.03 -0.55 -0.65 -0.44 -0.09 -0.39 0.01 0.00
1-2 Moose SC-Consistent -0.49 -0.87 -2.72 -1.71 1.64 4.87 0.19 0.50
SC-RP - - -3.37 -4.83 2.50 13.91 0.31 0.74
SC-SP -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.91 0.05 0.13
LC-Consistent -0.57 -0.27 0.99 0.86 2.15 4.53 -0.06 -0.03
LC-RP - - -5.90 -2.55 8.25 0.00 2.62 0.37
LC-SP 0.01 0.01 -0.44 -0.26 -0.26 -1.08 0.07 0.03
3-4 Moose SC-Consistent 1.67 2.37 1.03 0.70 -0.29 -0.82 0.31 0.53
SC-RP - - 0.70 0.98 0.32 1.80 0.30 0.99
SC-SP 0.31 0.84 0.31 0.56 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.23
LC-Consistent 3.32 1.38 1.24 0.94 0.01 0.02 -0.39 -0.16
LC-RP - - -2.25 -0.93 4.31 0.00 5.71 2.55
LC-SP 0.13 0.06 0.69 0.39 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.04
SP SC-Consistent -5.99 -2.93 -3.65 -0.82 -1.35 -1.40 -0.49 -0.31
outside dummy SC-RP - - - - - - - -
SC-SP -1.45 -11.14 -0.81 -2.57 -0.31 -6.31 -0.12 -1.20
LC-Consistent -9.76 -5.81 10.46 3.09 0.91 1.62 -1.10 -0.72
LC-RP - - - - - - - -
LC-SP -0.82 -0.18 -9.60 -4.75 -0.73 -3.01 -0.12 -0.03
Boldface indicated statistical significance at the 5% level. We exclude one site attribute, ‘On foot’ (Encounters
with other hunters on foot), which is used in von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) since ‘On foot’ has perfectly same
value as ‘No Hunter’, which make perfect multicolliearity problem.
a Unpaved site characteristics varies across sites and individual because individuals choose different roads to
assess the sites.
Table 2.6 The results of Welfare analysis
Model Case1 Case2 Case3
Single Class: Consistent -3.46 -9.48 99.76
Single Class: RP -3.76 - -
Latent Class: Only consistent Class -3.18 -3.90 72.27
Latent Class : weighted with RP -4.31 - -
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CHAPTER 3. DOES OBESITY MATTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT?
EVIDENCE FROM VEHICLE CHOICES AND DRIVING
3.1 Introduction
The rising rate of obesity has become a prominent social concern in the U.S. and throughout
the world. A recent report of the National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC) shows that 35.7
% of U.S. adults are obese in 2009-2010 (NCHS Data Brief 2012). It is a well-known fact that
obesity causes public health problems, such as high blood pressure, heart disease, and a number
of other adverse health conditions. These health problems increase medical costs to society as
well. Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012), for example, argue that obesity is associated with $2,741
(in 2005 dollars) per person higher annual medical health care costs in the U.S.
A number of recent studies suggest the societal impacts of obesity also extend to the en-
vironmental arena. The studies show that obesity can be an additional indirect factor leading
to increased gasoline consumption through several different channels. Broadly, the literature
focuses on the positive relation between obesity, vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and the share of
light trucks among noncommercial vehicles.1 Specifically, the literature analyzing how obesity
influences households’ driving or vehicle choice behavior can be classified into three categories:
(1) An engineering approach, (2) A focus on the relationship between VMT and obesity, and
(3) A focus on the relationship between vehicle choices and obesity.
The first group of studies examine the mechanical relationship between weight and vehicle
fuel efficiency. Jacobson and McLay (2006) show that obesity and overweight people increase
fuel consumption of noncommercial vehicles by 0.8 % due to the resulting additional weight in
vehicles. This corresponds to approximately one billion gallons of additional gasoline consumed
1Figure 3.1 shows the trend and relation between variables.
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in the U.S. on an annual basis. Similarly, Dannenberg (2004) indicate that the weight increase
of U.S. passengers account for up to a 2.4 % increase in fuel consumption by the U.S. airline
industry.
The second group of studies examine how obesity and overweight affect vehicle use and
vice versa. Courtemanche (2011) examines the sequential relation that lower fuel prices cause
people to use their vehicles more frequently, in turn, causing individuals to become more obese.
Using cross-sectional individual level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS), he found that a 1% increase in gasoline price would lead to a 10% reduction in the rate
of obesity and overweight. Jacobson et al. (2011) argue a positive relationship exists between
the number of miles driven by each licensed driver (VMT/LD) and adult obesity with a six-year
time lag. They estimate a one-mile increase in driving by all licensed drivers would result in
a 2.2% increase in the adult obesity rate six years later. However, it is likely to be a spurious
correlation because they do not control for other factors such as income, which may affect this
relationship and the corresponding time trend. For example, the video game market has been
growing tremendously over the last few decades. Nowadays, many adults and children enjoy
playing video games rather than participating in physical exercise. This would also cause an
increase in overweight and obesity. Without controlling for such factors, the causal relationship
between driving patterns and obesity can be difficult to discern.
Finally, Li et al. (2011) take this argument a step further by suggesting that obese and
overweight individuals also contribute to emissions through their vehicle choices. They estimate
the impact of obesity on vehicle choice by adopting the BLP-type aggregate data logit model
with county-level annual sales data. They find that new vehicles purchased by individuals, who
are obese or overweight, are, on average, less fuel efficient than those selected by others in the
general population. Their simulation results show that, had the U.S. rates for overweight and
obesity in 2005 had remained instead at their 1981 levels, there would have been a fuel savings
of 8.6%. However, in calculating these fuel savings, they implicitly assume that the VMT of
overweight and obesity people is equal to the VMT of the other individuals in the population.
While the results in earlier works are compelling, the analysis suffers from two shortcom-
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ings.2 First, researchers rely upon aggregate data (national level time series or county level
cross section data), rather than household level observations, which potentially mask impor-
tant factors determining vehicle choices and VMT. Second, while prior studies investigate a
relationship between obesity and either vehicle choices or vehicle miles traveled (VMT), linking
vehicle choices to overall gasoline consumption (or emissions) requires information regarding
vehicle use. In other words, the analysis implicitly assumes that obese individuals drive as
much as other individuals in the population. However, obesity may lead to a more sedentary
lifestyle, which could offset the individual’s choice for a less fuel efficient vehicle, resulting in
no net increase in transportation-related emissions. On the other hand, if obese individuals use
their vehicle more frequently, rather than say biking or walking, the overall impact of obesity
on overall emissions could be further exacerbated. In either case, ignoring the impact of weight
on vehicle use would provide an incomplete picture. As West (2004) points out, “. . . an unob-
served household characteristic that affects the utility of miles driven in a particular vehicle
bundle is likely to affect both its probability of selection and its intensity of use” (p. 740).
The corresponding demand equations for vehicle purchases or VMT are likely to yields biased
estimates.
The goal for this study is to address the two limitations of the existing literature by drawing
on the unique household level panel data set provided by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). To the best of our knowledge, the PSID is unique in providing vehicle ownership,
vehicle usage, and BMI information in a panel data setting. Using these data, we employ
two different empirical strategies: (1) a reduced-form fixed effects model and (2) a structural
discrete and continuous model of vehicle choice and VMT.
First, we employ the linear panel fixed effects model. In contrast to the data used in prior
studies, the PSID is a panel data set that can be used to ameliorate omitted variable bias by
removing time invariant unobserved variables through the use fixed effects. In the reduced-form
approach, we estimate the effect of obesity and overweight on VMT, fuel economy, and gasoline
consumption, providing a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between obesity
2We leave the first category of prior studies, i.e., mechanical relationship between fuel efficiency and weight
of passengers, as an area for engineers, focusing instead on the remaining relationships.
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and either VMT or fuel economy than previous studies. OLS estimates suggest that obesity
and overweight have significant impacts on VMT, fuel economy, and gasoline consumption.
Specifically, the OLS results suggest that overweight (BMI > 25) households drive 8.2% more,
own 2.3% less fuel efficient vehicles, and consume 9.4% more gasoline than non-overweight
households. However, fixed effects model leads to substantially different conclusions, namely
that the overweight households do not have a significant difference with normal households in
terms of either VMT or gasoline consumption, and they own just 0.7% less fuel efficient vehicles.
At the same time, obesity (BMI > 30) remains a significant factor in the fixed effects model.
Obese households drive 8.4% more and consume 6.3% more gasoline than non-obese (including
overweight and normal) households. Based on our fixed effect model results, we implement very
simple simulations with similar conditions with Li et al. (2011). Our simulation suggests that if
the rate of obesity (BMI >30) in 2005 (35.1 %) had remained at the 1981 level (15.0 %), gasoline
consumption in 2005 is 26,484 trillion btu instead of 27,309 trillion btu, i.e., approximately 3.0
% savings in gasoline consumption. Our findings suggest that obesity has an effect to reduce
gasoline consumption, but the magnitude of savings is not as large as prior studies predict.
Finally, in addition to the basic fixed effects model, we also estimate difference-in-difference
(DID) and instrumental variable models as other methods to control endogeneity of obesity
and overweight people.
As a structural approach, we adopt a joint discrete and continuous econometric model.
There are two types of discrete and continuous models used in prior studies. One set of
studies adopts a two-stage estimator developed by Dubin and McFadden (1984). Train (1986)
and West (2004) estimate the consumer’s behavior on vehicle purchases and their utilization
by adopting DM’s two-stage method. One main advantage of the DM method is relatively
easy to implement. However, the DM approach is inefficient because the two portions of the
discrete and continuous model are estimated separately, despite being driven by a common,
underlying behavioral model. The other approach used in the literature is a single-step (i.e.,
simultaneously) estimated model of vehicle choice and usage. For example, Bento et al. (2009)
estimate the distributional impact of gasoline tax on both vehicle purchases and VMT, while
Roth (2012) examines the equivalence between a simple fuel economy standard and a feebate.
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Spiller (2012) has recently extended this general modeling approach to better accommodate a
households choice of not only individual vehicles, but the portfolio of vehicles the individuals
choose to hold. The advantage of the single-step approach in estimation is it better reflects
the obvious joint nature of the vehicle purchased by a household and the vehicle miles traveled
by the household. However, estimation can be challenging when there are a large number of
alternatives and a nonlinear indirect utility function. Bento et al. (2009) employ the repeated
discrete-continuous choice model and the Bayesian estimation technique to accommodate the
large number of vehicle choices available to consumers. Based on the results of the structural
model, we investigate the impact of overweight (BMI > 25) on gasoline demand. If the rate
of overweight (BMI > 25) has remained at the 1981 level (47.1%) rather than 67.3%, the
gasoline consumption in 2005 is 26,870 trillon btu, a 1.6% savings which is even smaller than
our reduced-form results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the PSID data
used in our empirical analysis, including key summary statistics. Section 3 details the empirical
model and estimation strategy, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. In Section 5, we
present our conclusion.
3.2 Data
To assess the impact of obesity on gasoline demand through both vehicle choices and uti-
lization using household level, we collect the data from several sources. As a main source of
data, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In addition, vehicle characteris-
tics (e.g., fuel economy, wheelbase, etc.), come from Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, EPA fuel
economy, American Chamber of Commerce Researcher’s Association(ACCRA) Cost Of Living
Index (COLI), National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) used car price data, and
other web sources.
Our data for household characteristics, including vehicle ownership, gasoline expenditure,
and the Body Mass Index (BMI) for both the head and spouse come from the PSID.3 The PSID
3Since the PSID does not provide BMI directly, we computed it using information on height and weight and
the formula, weight(lb)
height(in)2
× 703.
38
began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of U.S. households and is the longest
running national panel study in the world. The PSID collects information on employment,
income, wealth, health, education, and numerous other socio-demographic characteristics. Until
1997, these data were collected on an annual basis, but has subsequently been conducted on
a biannual basis. Of particular interest to the current study is the fact, starting in 1999, the
PSID has collected details on vehicle-ownership, including manufacturer, model, and model
year, as well as gasoline expenditure.4 Therefore, our sample periods are the recent 6-surveys,
1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. The reason we use the PSID is, to the best of our
knowledge, it is unique in providing household-level panel data for both vehicle ownership and
BMI.5
To construct vehicle attributes, we use Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (1982-2009), which
includes a wide range of vehicle characteristics, such as fuel economy, wheelbase, length, width,
and horsepower by make, model, and model year. For most vehicles, we use EPA’s fuel economy
data set. However, the EPA data only covers vehicles built in 1984 onwards. Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook was used to construct fuel economy data for vehicle models older than 1984.
There are two main costs that affect vehicle choices and driving miles-vehicle purchase costs
and driving costs. Even though several different concepts have been used in prior studies, we
adopt the rental rate and per-mile operating cost suggested by Bento et al. (2009). The rental
rate is calculated as rij = Dj +ρPj +0.85I
A
ij , where (Dj , Pj , I
A
ij , ρ) denote the depreciation rate,
vehicle prices, annual insurance cost, and real interest rate, respectively. The depreciation and
vehicle price are calculated using NADA Used Car Guide data.6 Insurance costs vary with
vehicle manufacturer, model, prices, age, region, and other factors. However, there does not
exist data to reflect all factors. Therefore, we use state-level average insurance premiums from
4The PSID includes the number of vehicles each household owns or leases, and detailed model information
on up to three vehicles.
5The PSID data is open for public use and has been widely employed for a variety of studies in labor and
environmental economics. The PSID provides manufacturer, model year, and types (car, utility, pickup, and van)
related to information on vehicle and current state related to address. However, for more precise information, we
obtained the data for restricted use, which the PSID distributes confidentially through special contracts. Among
confidential data, for this study, we have acquired information on specific vehicle model (e.g., Toyota Camry)
and geospatial data regarding the individual household’s place of residence.
6Depreciation is calculated as difference of current and next year real used car prices. We use MSRP a vehicle
price.
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the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and proportion by vehicle make
and model computed from Insurance.com to obtain insurance premiums varying by region and
model.7
We use yearly average of Daily Treasury Real Long-Term Rates for the interest rate.
To calculate per-mile operating cost, pMij = (p
gas
i /MPGj) + 0.15I
M
ij , we use CBSA level
gasoline prices from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA)
data. Since the ACCRA data cover around 300 regions, these provide precise variations by
regions. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of gasoline price by regions and years. Addi-
tionally, in contrast to the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) widely used in prior
studies [Bento et al. (2009); Spiller (2012); Roth (2012)], the PSID does not provide vehi-
cle miles traveled. Instead, the PSID provides each household’s gasoline expenditures, as
compledted in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) used in other studies [Feng et al.
(2005); West (2004)]. Using the MPG of a household’s vehicles, we compute driving miles
as VMT = (Gasoline Expenditure/Gasoline Price) × MPG. In this case, using an accurate
measure of gasoline prices is important.8
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics by number of vehicles each household owns after
cleaning the data. The households which own one or two vehicles account for around 71.3%
of the PSID sample. As one might expect, many zero- and one-vehicle households belong to
low income households, while multi-vehicle households typically have higher incomes. The
rate of obesity and overweight is around 70%, very close to the national level for obesity and
overweight in 2009 (73%, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). The
rate of obesity does not differ substantially across the number of vehicles owned, multi-vehicle
households do exhibit a relatively large percentage of overweight people.
7As Bento et al. (2009) reported, assigning 85% for rental price and 15% to operating cost is followed by
insurance company’s suggestion.
8The NHTS is the authoritative source for national data on travel behaviors. Recently, NHTS released
data for 2001 and 2009. The NHTS VMT estimates (BESTMILE) are based on odometer reading, self-report
annual miles, and model year. Household’s average monthly VMT in 2001 and 2009 is 1765.6 and 1654.2 miles,
respectively. Even though our estimates in 2001 and 2009 are slightly lower than the NHTS estimates, they are
close and share the same trends to our estimates.
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3.3 Empirical Model
Our goal is to identify the causal effects that obesity affects on gasoline consumption through
vehicle choices and driving. To assess the impact of obesity, we investigate both reduced and
structural-form approaches.
3.3.1 Reduced-Form Approach
There are several issues that arise to establish a causal linkage between obesity (and over-
weight), and both vehicle purchases and usage. One of the key concerns is the confounding
effect of unobserved time-invariant factors on vehicle choices, such as individual education levels
or possibly commuting distance to work. Instrumental variable method is widely used to con-
trol these unobserved individual characteristics. However, as Angrist and Pischke (2009) note,
it is often difficult to find good instruments. In the current paper, we start with a fixed effects
panel data model to control for time invariant unobserved variables which may lead to omitted
variable bias. In our application, vehicle choices are correlated with miles traveled because
both discrete and continuous choices share common characteristics [West (2004)]. For exam-
ple, consumers who purchase vehicles with high fuel efficiency generally drive more because
the per-mile operating cost is low.9 This model is then expanded to control for the possible
endogeneity of obesity and overweight through the use of instrumental variables. Specifically,
we use as instruments sibling’s average BMI, participation in the food stamp program, and the
proportion of eating-out costs. In addition, we also implement standard difference-in-difference
by dealing with obesity and overweight as a treatment.
First, we describe a standard fixed effects model to assess the impact of obesity that controls
for unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity through the inclusion of individual fixed
effects and time fixed effects.10 Starting with the specification for fuel economy, we have
ln(MPGit) = α0 + αDit + β1 ln(GasPriceit−hi) + β2 ln(yit − rit) + Xitγ + ϕi + δt + εit (3.1)
9This behavioral response is called ‘rebound effect’ or ‘take-back effect’ and is studied further in the next
chapter.
10In estimation of all reduced-form models, we drop households, which do not own any vehicle because the
reduced-form model cannot control zero VMT and zero MPG appropriately. In other words, it can distort
estimates. However, the structural-form model, which will be discussed, includes zero-vehicle households because
the discrete choice model basically incorporates the option to “not own”.
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where Dit is an indicator variable that equals one, if the head of household i is obese or
overweight at time t, and GasPriceit−hi denotes the price of gasoline when the household’s
vehicle was purchased,11 yit denotes household income, rit denotes the vehicle rental rate, Xit
is a vector of household i’s characteristics at time t,12 ϕi is a household specific fixed effects, δt
denotes year fixed effects, and εit is an error term. The parameter α captures the causal effect
of interest, i.e., obesity and overweight, fuel efficiency.
The basic specification for VMT and Gasoline Demand is similar, with
ln(Yit) = α0 + αDit + β1 ln(OperatingCostit) + β2 ln(yit − rit) + Xitγ + ϕi + δt + εit (3.2)
where Yit is the outcome of interest (i.e., VMT and gasoline consumption) for household i at
time t, and OperatingCostit ≡ GasPriceit/MPGit).
A basic problem with the models in (3.1) and (3.2) is the obesity and overweight dummy
variables may be endogenous. We consider four approaches to handling this issue. First, we
estimate a difference-in-difference (DID) model utilizing the longitudinal nature of our PSID
data. The treatment group in our DID framework is the set of households not overweight in the
pre-treatment period but obese or overweight in the post-treatment periods, and the control
group is not obese or overweight households in both pre and post treatment period. The DID
estimation is basically the same as the fixed effects model [Angrist and Pischke (2009)]. The
only difference between fixed effects model and DID in our application is how to define control
and treatment groups. In the fixed effects model, we simply define obese or overweight people
as treatment, others are the control group. However, in DID framework, we restrict people,
who are non-obese and non-overweight, in both pre- and post-periods into the control group,
but assign people who are non-obese or non-overweight in the pre-treatment period and obese
or overweight in the post-treatment into the treatment group.
Second, we estimate instrumental variable versions of our models. The natural instrument
for obesity and overweight for each household is sibling’s BMI, which can be constructed using
using the PSID data. Additionally, we also employ the ratio for eating-out costs over food
11In the case of households with more than one vehicle, we use an average value of two or three gasoline prices
at the time of purchase.
12Specifically, Xit includes number of family, number of adults, number of vehicles, and age of vehicles.
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consumption, and the participation in food stamp program similar to Li et al. (2011).13 Using
these instruments, we estimate the impact of obesity, α, by classical 2SLS using instruments.
However, since Dit has a binary nature, we can write the linear functional form by the
taking expected value conditional on exogenous variables
E(ln(Yit)|Wit,Zit) = αE(Dit|Wit,Zit) + Witτ + E(εit|Wit,Zit)
= αP(Dit = 1|Wit,Zit) + Witτ (3.3)
where Wit = {ln(OperatingCostit), ln(yit − rit), ln(GasPriceit−hi),Yeart,Xit}, i.e., all exoge-
nous variables, and P(Dit = 1|Wit,Zit) is a probability that household i become obese or
overweight conditional on exogenous variables because Dit is binary. There are two ways to
estimate equation (3.3), leading to our third and fourth variations on the model in our basic
models. First, we can use a simple two-step procedure, (i) estimate P(Dit = 1|Wit,Zit) by
probit and obtain the first-stage fitted probabilities, Φˆit = Φ(pˆi0 + Xitpˆi1 + Zitpˆi2), and (ii) run
OLS using Φˆit in place of Dit. However, applying OLS directly with fitted probability cannot
guarantee consistency [Wooldridge (2010)]. Another way is to use the fitted probability as an
instrumental variable of Dit. In other words, as previous, (i) at the first stage, get the fitted
probabilities, Φˆit by probit estimation, and (ii) run 2sls, i.e. instrumental variable estimation
using Φˆit from the first stage as instrumental variable.
3.3.2 Structural-Form Approach
We next discuss our structural model approach based on each household’s utility maximiza-
tion. As discussed, since the vehicle choices and miles traveled are correlated by unobserved
household characteristics, the structural model should capture the relation to avoid bias in
estimation. There are several recent studies to analyze the consumer’s behavior on vehicles
and driving choices using joint estimation to control household unobserved characteristics [e.g.,
Bento et al. (2009); Feng et al. (2005); Roth (2012); Spiller (2012); and West (2004)]. We
adopt the model developed by Bento et al. (2009), which employs a full-information one-step
structural approach. The model assumes households face Ti choice occasions, i.e., in line with
13They use the ratio of average price of fast food over the average food price at home, and the participation
rate in the food stamp program as instruments for obesity rate in counties.
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mixed logit with repeated choices. The conditional indirect utility function is defined from the
log-linear VMT demand function as,
Uitj =

− 1λi exp
(
−λi
(
yi
Ti
))
+ Hϕi ϕi + µiεit0 if j = 0,
− 1λi exp
(
−λi
(
yi
Ti
− rij
))
− 1βi exp
(
αiH
α
i X
α
j + βijp
M
ij
)
+ τiH
τ
i X
τ
j + µiεitj if j = 1, ..., J
(3.4)
where βi = − exp(β˜i)
λi = exp(λ˜i)
and where (pMij , rij , yi) are vehicle per-mile operating cost, rental rate of vehicle, and income
of household i’s for jth vehicle, respectively, Hαi is household characteristics, Xj is vehicle
characteristics, and εitj is an error component capturing unobservable determinants of the
households decision, assumed an i.i.d. extreme value random variable.14
The other exogenous variables, except rental price and per-mile operating cost, that may
affect the household’s choices are included in αiH
α
i X
α
j . Above all, the key variable for this
study, obesity, and interaction with vehicle characteristics are included as
αiH
α
i X
α
j ≡ α1Di+
5∑
k=1
α2(k)i ·vintagejk +α3WBj +α4 · (WBj×Head Agei)+α5 · (# of Adults)
(3.5)
Following Hausman (1981), we derive the VMT demand equation by applying Roys identity.
VMTitj = exp
(
αiH
α
i X
α
j + βip
M
ij + λi
(
yi
Ti
− rij
))
+ ηitj , for j = 1, ..., J (3.6)
where ηitj represents an idiosyncratic error assumed independent across the J alternatives with
zero mean and standard deviation, σi = exp(σ
∗
i ), such that ηitj ∼ N(0, σi). Therefore, the
combined likelihood function is
Li =
Ti∏
t=1
 J∏
j=0
(
exp(Vij)∑
k exp(Vik)
)1itj J∏
j=1
log
(
Φ(VMTitj , σi|j)1itj
) (3.7)
14For the discrete choices model, we have to define choice sets, i.e., discrete choice alternatives following Bento
et al. (2009). We divide 10 vehicle classes (compact, luxury compact, midsize, fullsize, luxury mid/full size,
small SUV, large SUV, small truck, large truck, and mini van), 5 vintages (new, 1-2 years, 3-6 years, 7-11 years,
and 12-18 years), and 7 manufacturers (Ford, Chrysler, GM, Honda, Toyota, Other Asians, and European).
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where 1itj is an indicator function that equals 1 if household i chooses j at tth choice occa-
sion, and 0 otherwise. We adopt random parameters for all variables to reflect heterogeneous
taste and flexible specification. These random parameters and nonlinear specifications make
estimation via maximum simulated likelihood implausible. As Bento et al. (2009) suggested,
we employ Bayesian procedure using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique.15
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Reduced-Form Approach
The results of basic reduced-form model are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.2, and 3.4. Obser-
vations are weighted using the PSID survey weights. For comparisons, we report the results of
OLS estimation as well. It is well-known the OLS estimation can yield biased estimates due to
omitted variable, when the unobserved household time-invariant variables are correlated with
other variables. In our application, if the unobservable variables, such as diet, lifestyle, and
intensity of physical activity are correlated with the obesity and overweight variables, OLS
regression may result in inconsistent estimates. We report the results of a variety of additional
results that assess the overall robustness of the estimates using other alternative variables to
represent obesity and overweight, such as BMI, and height and weight as well.
Panels A and B of Table 3.2, show the estimates of core parameters of pooled OLS and fixed
effects model of the fuel economy equation. The parameters we are interested in are obesity
and overweight. Column (1) shows that overweight (BMI > 25) is a significant effect in both
OLS and fixed effects model. On the other hands, obesity does not have a statistically signif-
icant effect in fixed effects model while OLS estimate is a significant negative value. Column
(3) include both obesity and overweight, therefore, obesity parameter measure an additional
marginal effect over overweight. In both OLS and fixed effects model, there is no statistically
significant effect of obesity. Although obesity and overweight dummies give intuitively attrac-
tive measures, these variables lose some information by changing 0 or 1. Columns (4), (5), and
(6) present the result of the estimation with BMI, height, and weight. In particular, column
15The detailed estimation algorithm is described in appendix of Bento et al. (2009) and ch12 of Train (2009).
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(5) shows that ln(BMI) has a significant negative effect in both OLS and fixed effects model. In
addition, column (5) includes (BMI/100) and (BMI/100)2 to reflect non-linearity, the estimates
for these two variables are significant as well. Column (6) reports the result of estimation with
height and weight which are statistically significant in OLS but only weight is significant in fixed
effects model. Even though our results have the same direction with Li et al. (2011), the size of
the impact on fuel economy is relatively small. We will discuss and compare our results with Li
et al. (2011) below. Table 3.3 presents the estimation results of VMT regression. In contrast
to the results in fuel economy regression, overweight has a significant impact on VMT in OLS
but not in fixed effects model. On the other hand, a effect for obesity in column (2) shows
statistically significant estimates for both models. Moreover, the fixed effects model in column
(3) shows obesity has a significant marginal effect, whereas, only the overweight estimate is
statistically significant in OLS. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show any measures for obesity and
overweight, such as ln(BMI), (BMI/100)2, height, and weight, are not statistically significant
in fixed effects model. Above results for VMT and fuel economy imply obese household drive
8.4% more than non-obese households, and households with overweight head own 0.7% less fuel
efficient vehicles than non-overweight households.16 As a result of combining driving and fuel
efficiency, the estimation for gasoline consumption equation provides a final consequence. In
Table 3.4, panel A: OLS results show all measures, obesity (BMI > 30), overweight (BMI >
25), ln(BMI), (BMI/100), (BMI/100)2, and ln(height) have statistically significantly positive
effects on gasoline consumption. However, fixed effects model suggests households with obese
head consume gasoline more around 6 % than non-obese households.
To check robustness and compare results with the fixed effects model, we estimate the
impact of obesity and overweight through a variety of methods. First, by utilizing the nature of
the panel data, we implement difference-in-difference (DID). As discussed above, DID is widely
used in recent empirical works to measure treatment effects or policy impact. In our case,
treatment is obesity and overweight. The treatment group can be defined as people who were
not obese or overweight during the pre-treatment period, but become obese or overweight in the
16In log-linear model, the parameter of dummy variable can be interpreted as percent change because of
Y (D=1)−Y (D=0)
Y (D=0)
= exp(α)− 1 ≈ α at 0.
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post-treatment period. On the other hand, non-obese or non-overweight households in both pre
and post treatment period are assigned as a control group. In our application, households need
a time period to adjust their vehicles, i.e., fuel efficiency, (or sometimes driving) after treatment
since changing vehicles comes with a large number of costs. Therefore, we restrict treatment
group as households, which are non-obese or non-overweight in 1999, but obese or overweight
in 2003; while we compare the dependent variables between 1999 and 2009. That is to say,
we set 1999 as the pre-treatment period and 2009 as the post-treatment period. In Table 3.5,
DID results show that obesity and overweight are not statistically significant for all dependent
variables at the 5 % significance level. One ongoing concern in the literature on obesity is
endogeneity of obesity and overweight. A conventional way used in previous studies to overcome
is the instrumental variable approach [Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012); Li et al. (2011)]. We
adopt sibling’s average BMI, proportion of eating-out cost to total food cost, and whether
a household receives food-stamps used in previous literature as instruments for obesity and
overweight. However, as indicated in the previous section, due to the binary nature of obesity
and overweight dummies, applying 2sls using instruments is possibly inefficient. Therefore, we
investigate the impact of obesity and overweight through several different approaches using
IV. Table 3.6 reports the estimates of IV regression. In all cases, obesity and overweight
have significant effects just on ln(MPG). However, IV estimates are much larger in magnitude
than fixed effects and OLS. In addition, several prior studies report the endogeneity of fuel
economy in estimation of the VMT [Linn (2013); Frondel and Vance (2013)]. This study
adopts two kind of instruments for fuel economy; (1) gasoline prices at the time the vehicle
was purchased and its interactions with household characteristics, (2) gasoline guzzler tax.
The results of IV regression with both instruments, i.e., for obesity and overweight, and fuel
economy, are presented in Table 3.7. There is no statistically significant estimates, which are
very large values. As Frondel and Vance (2013) noted, gasoline prices at the time of purchasing
vehicles for fuel economy suffer from weak instrumental problem. Further, although gas guzzler
tax is highly correlated with fuel economy, the variable is also possibly endogeneous because
it can be correlated with observed and unobserved variables, such as vehicle prices and the
comport of vehicle. On the other hand, our estimates cannot be matched with those for prior
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studies because they use different units of data (e.g., the rate of obesity and overweight) and
models. However, our results roughly compare with Li et al. (2011). They report that the MPG
elasticity to obesity and overweight rate is -0.289, i.e., 1 % increase in obesity and overweight
rate brings with 0.289 % decrease in fuel economy. Moreover, they show that if the rate of
obesity and overweight in 2005 (67 %), had remained at the 1981 level (47 %), the average
fuel economy for new vehicles demanded in 2005 would be increased from 22.99 to 24.98 miles
per gallon. However, based on our results that obese and overweight people own 0.7 % less
fuel efficient vehicle, we derive only a slightly increase in MPG, i.e., 23.02 instead of 22.99
from simple calculations. Li et al. (2011) also suggest that approximately 8.6% savings in
gasoline consumption can be obtained through the improvement of fuel efficiency by a decrease
in the rate of obesity and overweight.17 From the results in Table 3.4, overweight (BMI >25)
does not have a significant effect on gasoline consumption. With the same simple calculation
and if the rate of obesity (BMI >30) in 2005 (35.1 %) had remained at the 1981 level (15.0
%), the gasoline consumption in 2005 is 26,484 trillion btu instead of 27,309 trillion btu, i.e.,
approximately 3.0 % savings in gasoline consumption.18
3.4.2 Structural-Form Approach
We use each year’s data for estimation rather than pooled data from 1999 to 2009 because
the full sample includes too many observations to estimate the model with random parameters.
Decomposing the sample allows us to understand the change of preferences over time. The
parameters in the structural model cannot be interpreted directly because of non-linearity in
contrast to a reduced linear form model. Therefore, we compute marginal effects of obesity
and overweight by using the following simple equations. J∑
j=1
Pij(Di = 1) ·MPGj
−
 J∑
j=1
Pij(Di = 0) ·MPGj

[∑J
j=1 Pij(Di = 0) ·MPGj
] × 100 (3.8)
17Li et al. (2011) assume that annual VMT is 12,000 miles and constant for all households regardless of the
rate of obesity.
18Source: the rate of obesity http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity adult 07 08/obesity adult 07 08.pdf,
and fuel consumption http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec2 11.pdf
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VMTij∗(Di = 1)−VMTij∗(Di = 0)
VMTij∗(Di = 0)
× 100 (3.9)
[∑J
j=1 Pij(Di = 1) · (VMTij(Di = 1)/MPGj)
]
−
[∑J
j=1 Pij(Di = 0) · (VMTij(Di = 0)/MPGj)
]
[∑J
j=1 Pij(Di = 0) · (VMTij(Di = 0)/MPGj)
] ×100
(3.10)
where Di represents dummy variable for obesity or overweight. Equations (3.8), (3.9), and
(3.10) are marginal effects of obesity or overweight on fuel economy, VMT, and gasoline con-
sumption, respectively. In particular, equation (3.10) for gasoline consumption reflects the
comprehensive impact of obesity or overweight through the change of both VMT and fuel
economy. Table 3.8 reports the average effects of overweight (BMI > 25) for the joint discrete
and continuous model. In comparison with the results of the reduced-form approaches, the
impact of overweight on fuel economy is relatively small, but it has larger effects on VMT.
To compare with the reduced-form approaches and Li et al. (2011), we implement the same
simulations as the reduced-form approaches. Even though our results provide different results
according to survey year, based on the results of 2003 year, we can compute the impact of
overweight (BMI > 25) on gasoline demand. If the rate of overweight (BMI > 25) remained
at the 1981 level (47.1%) rather than 67.3%, the gasoline consumption in 2005 is 26,870 trillon
btu, a 1.6% savings, which is even smaller than our reduced-form results.
3.5 Conclusions
The rising rate of obesity has contributed large social and economic problems over the
last several decades in the U.S. and throughout the world. It is well-known that the high
prevalence of obesity is accompanied by several negative health problems such as high blood
pressure, diabetes, or heart disease. Besides these common negative effects, recent studies
examine the impact of obesity and overweight on the environment through vehicle emissions.
There are two channels to increase gasoline consumption - low fuel economy and more vehicle
use. There are two main concerns in the previous research. First, employing aggregate types
of data, such as the national level time series or county level cross section data, makes difficult
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to control for unobserved individual or household characteristics. Second, prior studies focus
on one side of impacts, i.e VMT or fuel economy. Two channels on gasoline consumption may
cause conflicting or synergistic actions.
The objective of this study is to provide a complete picture for the impact of obesity
on gasoline consumption by adopting household level observations from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). We investigate the impact of obesity by employing both reduced-
form (linear panel model) and structural model (joint discrete and continuous choice model).
Based on our estimates, we implement simple simulations in line with Li et al. (2011). First,
for the reduced-form model, if the prevalence of obesity in 2005 has remained at the 1981 level,
gasoline consumption would be 3% saved. On the other hand, the structural model shows that
if the rate of overweight in 2005 has remained at the 1981 level, only 1.6% less gasoline would
be demanded. Our empirical findings suggest that the comprehensive impact of obesity and
overweight on gasoline consumptions are minimal or ambiguous in contrast to the results of
prior studies considering either driving or vehicle choices.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
HH with 0 Vehicle HH with 1 Vehicle HH with 2 Vehicle HH with 3 Vehicle
Household Size 2.28 2.17 3.03 3.33
(1.59) (1.39) (1.31) (1.30)
Number of Adults 1.43 1.44 2.03 2.35
(0.69) (0.64) (0.52) (0.69)
VMT (1000 miles) - 12.94 20.65 26.42
- (10.89) (15.08) (22.15)
Average MPG - 20.64 19.60 19.47
- (4.10) (3.05) (2.57)
Rate of Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28
(0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Rate of Overweight (BMI > 25) 0.63 0.65 0.74 0.75
(0.48) (0.48) (0.44) (0.44)
Age of Head 45.08 43.84 43.98 46.38
(19.17) (16.94) (14.03) (11.68)
Years of Education (years) 11.42 13.04 13.47 13.34
(2.79) (2.58) (2.56) (2.54)
Household Income < $30,000 0.73 0.37 0.09 0.05
(0.44) (0.48) (0.29) (0.22)
Household Income $30,000 - $60,000 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.20
(0.40) (0.49) (0.44) (0.40)
Household Income $60,000 - $75,000 0.08 0.24 0.64 0.75
(0.27) (0.43) (0.48) (0.44)
Household Income > $75,000 0.05 0.16 0.49 0.62
(0.21) (0.36) (0.50) (0.49)
Households (share) 6,257 (17.4%) 12,419 (34.5%) 13,279 (36.8 %) 4,085 (11.3 %)
Note: The standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 3.2 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight on Fuel Economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PanelA: OLS
Obesity (BMI > 30) -0.013*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.005)
Overweight (BMI > 25) -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004)
ln(BMI) -0.029***
(0.005)
(BMI/100) -0.224***
(0.033)
(BMI/100)2 0.116***
(0.019)
ln(Height) -0.058***
(0.007)
ln(Weight) -0.394***
(0.027)
ln(GasPricet−h) 0.016** 0.016** 0.016* 0.016** 0.002 0.018**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(Income - Rental Price) -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Panel B: Fixed Effects Model
Obesity (BMI > 30) -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Overweight (BMI > 25) -0.007** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
ln(BMI) -0.011**
(0.005)
(BMI/100) -0.103**
(0.049)
(BMI/100)2 0.051**
(0.026)
ln(Weight) -0.034**
(0.016)
ln(Height) -0.031
(0.070)
ln(GasPricet−h) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(Income - Rental Price) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.3 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight on VMT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PanelA: OLS
Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.048** 0.015
(0.023) (0.028)
Overweight (BMI > 25) 0.082*** 0.076***
(0.021) (0.026)
ln(BMI) 0.094**
(0.042)
(BMI/100) 0.803***
(0.287)
(BMI/100)2 -0.420**
(0.170)
ln(Height) 0.174***
(0.061)
ln(Weight) -0.010
(0.230)
ln(GasPrice/MPG) -0.382*** -0.376*** -0.382*** -0.376*** -0.378*** -0.391***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
ln(Income - Rental Price) 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.113***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Panel B: Fixed Effects Model
Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.084** 0.082**
(0.041) (0.041)
Overweight (BMI > 25) 0.020 0.014
(0.038) (0.038)
ln(BMI) 0.022
(0.050)
(BMI/100) 0.506
(0.468)
(BMI/100)2 -0.283
(0.242)
ln(Weight) 0.183
(0.182)
ln(Height) -0.200
(0.749)
ln(GasPrice/MPG) -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.421***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
ln(Income - Rental Price) 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively. Fixed effects model include # of family, # of adults, #
of vehicle, vehicle age fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Pooled OLS include all variables in fixed effects model
and head age, head education and city size by population fixed effects as well.
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Table 3.4 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight on Gasoline Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PanelA: OLS
Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.061*** 0.025
(0.018) (0.023)
Overweight (BMI > 25) 0.094*** 0.084***
(0.016) (0.020)
ln(BMI) 0.320*** 0.116***
(0.045) (0.031)
(BMI/100) 0.940***
(0.211)
(BMI/100)2 -0.485***
(0.124)
ln(Height) 0.212***
(0.045)
ln(Weight) 0.122
(0.173)
ln(GasPrice/MPG) 0.320*** 0.328*** 0.320*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.304***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
ln(Income - Rental Price) 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.111***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Panel B: Fixed Effects Model
Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.063** 0.061*
(0.031) (0.031)
Overweight (BMI > 25) 0.022 0.017
(0.028) (0.028)
ln(BMI) 0.017
(0.039)
(BMI/100) 0.285
(0.355)
(BMI/100)2 -0.160
(0.183)
ln(Weight) 0.120
(0.135)
ln(Height) -0.079
(0.535)
ln(GasPrice/MPG) 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
ln(Income - Rental Price) 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
Table 3.5 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight: Difference-in-Difference
ln(MPG) ln(VMT) ln(Gas Demand)
Overweight (BMI > 25) -0.027* -0.006 0.010
(0.015) (0.110) (0.098)
Obesity (BMI > 30) 0.011 0.014 -0.012
(0.094) (0.019) (0.089)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.6 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight: Instrumental Variable Approach 1
IV Probit-2SLS Probit-OLS
Overweight (BMI > 25)
ln(VMT) 0.070 -0.250 -0.317
(0.045) (0.307) (0.394)
ln(MPG) -0.094** -0.088*** -0.049**
(0.039) (0.033) (0.022)
ln(Gas Demand) -0.142 -0.079 -0.103
(0.310) (0.228) (0.293)
Obesity (BMI > 30)
ln(VMT) 0.048 -0.386 -0.380
(0.051) (0.381) (0.382)
ln(MPG) -0.074** -0.067** -0.030*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.017)
ln(Gas Demand) -0.165 -0.197 -0.197
(0.270) (0.284) (0.284)
Instruments Sibling’s BMI Sibling’s BMI Sibling’s BMI
for Obesity or Overweight Food-Stamp Food-Stamp Food-Stamp
Eating-Out Cost Eating-Out Cost Eating-Out Cost
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
Table 3.7 Average Effects of Obesity and Overweight: Instrumental Variable Approach 2
IV1 IV2 Probit-IV1 Probit-IV2
Overweight (BMI > 25)
ln(VMT) -0.313 -0.376 -0.119 -0.160
(0.319) (0.419) (0.253) (0.294)
ln(Gas Demand) -0.127 -0.182 0.067 0.144
(0.244) (0.316) (0.190) (0.220)
Obesity (BMI > 30)
ln(VMT) -0.258 -0.370 -0.215 -0.271
(0.313) (0.364) (0.325) (0.364)
ln(Gas Demand) -0.104 -0.196 -0.051 0.075
(0.237) (0.275) (0.243) (0.277)
Instruments Sibling’s BMI Sibling’s BMI Sibling’s BMI Sibling’s BMI
for Obesity or Overweight Food-stamp Food-stamp Food-stamp Food-stamp
Eating-out Cost Eating-out Cost Eating-out Cost Eating-out Cost
for MPG P git−hi Gas Guzzler Tax P
g
it−hi Gas Guzzler Tax
Interactions Interactions
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.8 Average Effects of Overweight: Structural-Form Model
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
MPG (%) -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
VMT (%) 13.740 14.479 15.591 23.109 10.097 15.924
(4.852) (3.467) (3.661) (3.014) (3.625) (3.808)
Gasoline (%) 8.118 8.404 8.999 13.554 5.773 9.244
(2.857) (2.012) (2.113) (1.769) (2.081) (2.207)
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CHAPTER 4. VEHICLE FUEL EFFICIENCY AND THE REBOUND
EFFECT: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. PANEL DATA
4.1 Introduction
Global warming represents a profound environmental threat to our planet and mobile
sources of air pollution represent a key contributor to this problem. Indeed, the transportation
sector as a whole ranks second as a source of global carbon emissions, accounting for roughly
28% of annual emission of carbon dioxide (EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gases and Sinks
2014).1 U.S. efforts to reduce the carbon footprint of its transportation sector have centered
around the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. These standards require ve-
hicle manufacturers to meet a sales-weighted, fleet-wide, fuel economy benchmark. However, an
unintended consequence of CAFE standards is people may drive more as vehicle fuel efficiency
increases. This so-called ‘rebound effect’ potentially offsets much of the gains in the reduction
of energy consumption sought through the CAFE standards.
The rebound effect can be divided into two components: direct and indirect rebound ef-
fects. Specifically, the direct effect consists of total substitution and a ‘partial’ income effect
stemming from a change in fuel price or fuel efficiency. The ‘partial’ income effect captures the
increased or decreased usage of the vehicles owned by an individual in response to a price or
fuel efficiency change. The remaining indirect rebound effect corresponds to the changes of the
energy consumption on other energy using product, i.e. other transportation or appliances.
Ideally, both direct and indirect rebound effects should be considered to capture the entire
rebound effect. However, as it is difficult to estimate the indirect effect, most studies in the
literature focus only on quantifying the direct effect, an approached followed in this paper as
1Source: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
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well.
While there is already substantial literature on the rebound effect, there remains no consen-
sus regarding its magnitude. Estimates of the rebound vary substantially, changing with the
empirical methods employed, the types of or time periods covered by the available data, and
the specific definition used to characterize the rebound effect. Several different types of data
sets have been used in prior studies, including cross-sectional household level data, aggregate
panel data, and time-series data, with only a single German data set drawing on household
level panel data [Frondel et al. (2008, 2012); Frondel and Vance (2013)]. The reported VMT
elasticity estimates of the rebound effect from studies using household level data range from
0.1 to 0.9, while those from studies using aggregate data are in the range from 0.03 to 0.34.
One of the main concerns in estimating the rebound effect is the potential endogeneity of
the fuel economy variable, with fuel economy potentially correlated with unobserved household
and/or vehicle characteristics. Two approaches have dominated the literature in dealing with
this issue: (1) the use of instrumental variables for fuel economy and (2) a joint discrete
and continuous choice model along the lines of Dubin and McFadden (1984) that explicitly
accounts for the correlation between vehicle miles traveled and vehicle choices. The difficulty
with the instrumental variable approach is the availability of suitable instruments, while the
discrete-continuous choice model approach depends upon structural assumptions. This paper
addresses the endogeneity issue, instead, through the use of panel data techniques, controlling
for unobserved, but time invariant household factors with fixed effects. Data for the analysis
are provided by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), yielding a household level panel
data base for 1999 through 2011. For comparison, we implement several different estimation
strategies, including pooled OLS, random and fixed effects models, and an instrumental variable
model.
Finally, although the rebound effect generally refers to the VMT response to the introduc-
tion of more efficient vehicles, i.e., the elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel economy, there
are other definitions of the rebound effect used in the literature. For example, studies measure
the rebound effect in terms of the elasticity of VMT with respect to gasoline price or per-mile
operating cost. An important assumption underlying these alternative definitions is consumers
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react the same way to a decrease in gasoline prices versus an improvement in fuel economy.
In other words, they do not care about where the reduction of costs come. Studies that have
tested this hypothesis do not provide a consistent conclusion [Gillingham (2012); Greene (2012);
Frondel et al. (2012); Small and Dender (2007)]. To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the
rebound effect based on various definitions. While our estimates of the rebound effect vary
somewhat with definition used, from 0.58 to 0.80, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
response to fuel price and fuel economy are the same. Finally, we examine the heterogeneous
responses to the change of price or fuel efficiency across income deciles. We find a statistically
significant difference in the rebound effect for low and high income households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the recent
literature estimating the rebound effect. Section 3 details the data used in this study, while
Section 4 describes the empirical model specifications. Section 5 presents estimation results.
The paper summarizes in section 6 with conclusions.
4.2 Related Literature
A number of papers have appeared in the literature estimating the elasticity of vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) or fuel used with respect to fuel price or fuel economy. These elasticities are
broadly accepted as alternative measures of the ‘rebound effect.’ However, the magnitude of the
estimated rebound effect varies with the definition, empirical modeling techniques employed,
and the type of data used [EPA and DOT (2012); Gillingham et al. (2014); Sorrell et al.
(2009)]. This section begins with an overview of the competing definitions for the rebound
effect appearing in the literature, followed by a summary of results, methodologies, and types
of data used in the literature. Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2008) provide a relatively recent and
more extensive summary of the rebound effect literature.
4.2.1 Defining the Rebound Effect
The definition for the rebound effect can be largely categorized into four types of elasticities,
(1) an elasticity of vehicle traveled miles (VMT) with respect to fuel economy, (2) an elasticity
of VMT with respect to per-mile operating cost, (3) an elasticity of fuel demand with respect
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to fuel economy, and (4) an elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel price. Formally, the first
definition of the rebound effect is based on the canonical relation, i.e., higher fuel economy
leads to more driving.
Definition 1 Elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel economy:
ηµ(VMT) =
∂ ln(VMT)
∂ ln(µ)
(4.1)
where µ is fuel economy (MPG).
Although definition 4.1 is the most natural, it assumes consumer’s choice of fuel economy is
exogenous.
A second definition is based on per-mile operating cost, capturing the impact of both fuel
efficiency and fuel price.2
Definition 2 Elasticity of VMT with respect to per-mile operating cost (pM ):
ηpM (VMT) = −
∂ ln(VMT)
∂ ln(pM )
(4.2)
where per-mile operating cost is defined as fuel price divided by fuel economy (MPG), pgas/µ.
There are two key assumptions underlying definition 4.2. First, as was the case for definition
4.1, fuel economy is treated as exogenous. Second, the impact of the change in fuel economy
on VMT is the same as the impact of changing fuel prices, i.e., the reduction of per-mile
operating cost due to an increase in fuel economy is the same as those due to a decrease in
fuel prices. There is evidence in the literature suggesting this assumption does not always hold
[Linn (2013)].
The third and fourth definitions are as follows:
Definition 3 Elasticity of Gasoline Demand with respect to fuel prices:
ηpgas(Gasoline Demand) = −∂ ln(Gasoline Demand)
∂ ln(pgas)
(4.3)
2Note the rebound effect in this case is the negative of the elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel cost. The
sign change is standard in the literature, making the signs comparable across the various definitions of the
rebound effect.
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Definition 4 Elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel prices:
ηpgas(VMT) = −∂ ln(VMT)
∂ ln(pgas)
(4.4)
where pgas is fuel price.
Frondel et al. (2008) show that the four definitions are equivalent, if the following assumptions
hold: (1) fuel price are exogenous, (2) fuel efficiency does not depend on fuel price, i.e., µ is
not a function of pgas, and (3) individuals respond to a change in fuel prices and fuel economy
equivalently (i.e., measuring their impact solely in terms of the associated change in operating
costs).3 In our empirical analysis, we explicitly test this third assumption.
4.2.2 Evidence in the Literature
The techniques employed in recent literature on the rebound effect can be broadly divided
into two groups: (1) reduced-form linear models (employing pooled OLS, panel estimation, and
IV regression approaches) versus (2) structural (joint discrete and continuous choice) models.
The structural models capture the discrete choices made by individuals in terms of which (and
how many) vehicles to own and the continuous choice of how many vehicle miles to travel [Bento
et al. (2009); Roth (2012); Spiller (2012); West (2004)]. Joint modeling of these two decisions
accounts for the bias stemming from unobserved household characteristics that simultaneously
influence both vehicle choice and VMT. The joint models typically rely on household level
cross-sectional data (e.g., the National Household Travel Survey, NHTS, or the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, CEX). Examples of structural models include Bento et al. (2009), who
estimate the gasoline price or per-mile operating cost elasticity of VMT to be in the range from
0.34 to 0.74, and Spiller (2012) and Roth (2012), with rebound effect estimates of 0.45 and
0.62, respectively. These three studies use 2001 and 2009 NHTS data. West (2004), using 1997
CEX data, shows the largest value, 0.87.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of recent rebound effect estimates categorized by definition,
data sources and estimation methods. Reduced-form studies use a variety of techniques and
data sources. A series of studies [Frondel et al. (2008, 2012); Frondel and Vance (2013)] estimate
3Li et al.(forthcoming) show that gasoline prices are exogenous.
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the rebound effect using German household panel data (German Mobility Panel) through a
variety of estimation strategies, including random effects models, fixed effects models, and
quantile regression. The estimates of the rebound effect in their studies generally have larger
values than for other studies (ranging from 0.42 to 0.90), although this is attributed, in part, to
better public transportation and higher fuel price in Germany [Gillingham et al. (2014)]. Linn
(2013) estimates fuel efficiency elasticity with household cross-sectional data (NHTS) using
instrumental variables (IV) regression to control for the endogeneity of fuel economy. The best
estimate by Linn (2013) is 0.44, larger than the most OLS-based estimates.
Finally, estimates of the rebound effect in studies using aggregate data, such as Small
and Dender (2007) using aggregate panel data and Hughes et al. (2008) using aggregate time
series data, vary between 0.03 and 0.22, falling at the lower end of the estimates in Table 4.1.
This may stem, in part, from attenuation bias, due to ignored heterogeneity in the household
characteristics when relying on aggregate data.
4.3 Data
This study employs the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal survey of
a representative sample of U.S. households that began in 1968. Starting in 1999, the PSID
collected data biannually.4 The survey collects a wide range of economic, sociological, and
psychological variables. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, beginning in 1999, the
PSID includes information on vehicles each household holds, with the specific make, model,
and year for each vehicle (e.g., Honda Civic 2010).5 For this reason, we use the biannual
samples beginning in 1999 continuing through 2011. After dropping observations with missing
information, the final data included 40,447 observations.6
Based on specific vehicle model information from the PSID, we constructed vehicle charac-
teristics, including fuel economy, for each vehicle in the database using combining information
4All observations are weighted using the PSID sampling weight.
5Although the PSID provides the information on vehicle year, make, and manufacturer publicly, the specific
models are provided only under a restricted use contract. Such a contract was acquired for the purpose of this
study.
6Appendix describe data sources and process to construct the final data set in detail.
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from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and WARD’s Automotive Yearbook.7
Finally, the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers’ Association (ACCRA) data are used
to obtain gasoline prices varying with region (CMSA level) and month. The ACCRA provides
only quarterly average gasoline prices by CMSA. To construct monthly gasoline prices, we com-
pute monthly variations within each quarter from EIA monthly state average gasoline prices,
and then apply these values to the ACCRA data. Additionally, since the ACCRA does not
cover all CMSA shown in the PSID, we impute the gasoline prices using EIA gasoline prices at
the state level.
Table 4.2 lists summary statistics by years. Household characteristics do not vary much
across the sample years. Average family income in the PSID sample is somewhat higher than
the national median. This is due, in part, to the fact we have restricted our sample to households
that own at least one vehicle, thus excluding many households in the lower tail of the income
distribution. The reported income has large standard variations because the total family income
in the PSID includes actual loss, i.e., negative values.8
Related to vehicle variables, note the fuel economy was generally declining from 1999
through 2005, but subsequently has increased. National representative statistics by the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics also show the overall fuel economy of new light-duty vehicles in
same period did not improve much (0.7 MPG), while the fuel economy for new vehicles did
increase substantially (2 MPG). At the same time, gasoline prices vary significantly across
years, from a low in 1999 of $1.01 per gallon to $3.77. Gasoline prices did drop sharply in
2009, following the start of the Great Recession. VMT have generally declined over the sample
period, although there was an increase in 2009, perhaps reflecting an increase in driving relative
to flying in response to the Great Recession.
7The website, fueleconomy.org supported by EPA and Department of Energy(DOE) provides miles per gallon
(MPG) by make, model, and year for vehicles between 1985 to present. However, our sample includes models
older than 1985. For the vehicles 1982 to 1984, we obtained the MPG from WARD’s Yearbook.
8In addition, the PSID includes a few extreme values which make a slightly large average household income.
However, the median values show our data are close to national values. The nominal median income for our
2011 sample is $58,000, slightly higher than the national median income, $50,046.
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4.4 Empirical Model
The empirical models adopted in this paper are based on a simple linear specification used
in prior studies. In particular, the basic linear regression takes the form,
ln(VMTit) = α+ β1 ln(MPGit) + β2 ln(p
gas
it ) + D
′
iγ + X
′
itδ + λZit + ε˜it (4.5)
where i and t are used to index household and time, respectively. The vector Di includes time-
invariant household characteristics, such as education or regional location, while the vector
Xit includes time-variant household characteristics, such as income. Finally, Zit is vehicle
class fixed effect to control for the correlation between fuel economy and other broad vehicle
characteristics.
One concern with estimating the model in (4.5) is any unobserved household characteristics
(say Dui ) are implicitly included in the error term ε˜it. Formally, the error term in equation (4.5)
can be rewritten as ε˜it = D
u′
iγ
u + εit where D
u
i, denotes a vector of unobserved household
characteristics, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. To the extent that these unobservables
are correlated with both vehicle choices, fuel efficiency and vehicle miles traveled, estimates of
the rebound effect (i.e., β1) will suffer from omitted variables bias. Dubin and McFadden (1984)
proposed a two-stage discrete-continuous model using the conditional expectation correction
method to control for such unobserved household characteristics in the context of household
appliance and energy usage.
In the current paper, we instead take advantage of the panel structure of the PSID data to
control for unobserved individual effects through the use of a fixed effects model. Specifically,
we can rewrite our simple linear model as follows:
ln(VMTit) = α+ β1 ln(MPGit) + β2 ln(p
gas
it ) + D
′
iγ + D
u′
iγ
u +X′itδ + λZit + εit
= αi + β1 ln(MPGit) + β2 ln(p
gas
it ) +X
′
itδ + λZit + εit (4.6)
where the individual fixed effect, αi ≡ α+D′iγ+Du′iγu, captures both observed and unobserved
time-invariant variables. Ignoring individual (or household) unobserved variables lead to bias
[Angrist and Pischke (2009)]. With this panel data structure, the omitted variable bias is
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eliminated implicitly through demeaning of the regression equation; i.e.,9
ln(VMTit)− ln(VMTi) = β1[ln(MPGit)− ln(MPGi)] + β2(pgasit − pgasi ) + (Xit −Xi)′δ
+λ(Zit − Zi) + (εit − εi)
4 ln(VMTit) = β14 ln(MPGit) + β24pgasit +4X′itδ + λ4Zit +4εit (4.7)
where 4 ln(VMTit) = ln(VMTit)− ln(VMTi) and so on. In the time-demeaned equation (4.7),
the unobserved time-invariant variables captured by αi are eliminated.
In summary, when estimating the rebound effect, there are two primary sources for omitted
variable bias identified in the literature, (1) unobserved household characteristics and (2) unob-
served vehicle characteristics, potentially correlated with fuel economy variable [Linn (2013)].
In our preferred model, we control these two sources by including vehicle class fixed effects
and adopting the individual fixed effect model in a panel data setting. We also allow for time-
period effects, i.e., year dummy variables to account for any aggregate individual-invariant time
variables.
4.5 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 provides estimates of the rebound effects, based on empirical models of definition
1. As noted above, our empirical models include several fixed effects, such as vehicle class, city
size, year, and vehicle age, to control for household and vehicle characteristics. Along with base
models from equations (4.5) and (4.6), i.e., pooled OLS, random effects (RE), and fixed effects
(FE) models, we also implement an IV regression, as well as random and fixed effects models
with IV. In particular, we adopt the instruments proposed by Linn (2013); i.e., fuel price at the
time the vehicle was purchased and interaction of this fuel price with household characteristics,
such as household size, number of adults, vehicle age, number of vehicle, income, and education
level fixed effects.
9Another way to correct omitted variable bias from unobserved variable is an instrumental variable (IV)
approach. Linn (2013) proposes to use the gasoline price when the vehicle was purchased and its interactions
with household characteristics as instrument variables. In the following section, we also report results based on
the IV method following Linn (2013).
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Columns 2 through 4 in Table 4.3 provide the baseline OLS, RE, and FE model estimates,
respectively, employing the full sample. The estimated rebound effect using definition 1 (cor-
responding to the coefficient β1 on ln(MPG) in equation (4.5) falls within a very narrow range
(0.53 to 0.56) and is statistically significant at a 1% level for all three models. Our estimates
are generally larger than the values in the recent literature, but lie well within the range found
in the literature.10
Instead, if definition 2 is used to characterize the rebound effect (corresponding to the
coefficient −β2 on ln(pgasit ) in equation (4.5), the estimated rebound effect for our three baseline
models lies between 0.61 and 0.64, and the estimates are statistically significant at a 1% level.
This falls well within the range (from -0.23 to -0.80) given by Graham and Glaister (2002)
from their extensive review of previous studies. As noted in our literature review section, the
use of definition 2 for the rebound effect is equivalent to the measure based on definition 1,
if the gasoline prices are exogenous and the consumer’s response to a 1% change in gasoline
prices are equivalent with 1% change in fuel economy. The evidence supporting the hypothesis
(H0 : β1 = −β2) is controversial in the literature. Some studies report no difference between the
two rebound measures [e.g., Frondel et al. (2012); Small and Dender (2007)]. However, other
studies find fuel economy has a large significant effect on VMT [Gillingham (2012)], while
gasoline prices do not have a statistically significant impact on VMT [Li et al.(forthcoming)
and Linn (2013)].11 We test the linear hypothesis that the elasticity of VMT with respect to
fuel economy is same as the the negative elasticity of VMT with respect to gasoline prices. The
test results are presented in the last row of Table 4.3. Our results show that the equivalence
of coefficients of logged fuel economy and logged gasoline prices. Additionally, the estimates
for IV, RE, and FE with IV are presented in columns 5 to 7 of Table 4.3. According to the
results of Linn (2013), the Angrist-Pischke first-stage F-test statistics (F = 7.25) reject the null
hypothesis as a weak instrument, overidentifying restriction test, Hansen’s J test (J statistics
10In our applications, a Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the random effects model is valid. Therefore,
our preferred model is fixed effects model.
11Li et al.(forthcoming) and Linn (2013) use cross-sectional data, NHTS. One possible explanation for in-
significant estimates is that the cross-sectional data do not have sufficient variation, even though gasoline prices
vary by region and quarter. Figure C.1 shows the distribution for gasoline prices in 2010 and 1991 to 2010 at
state-level. The standard deviation of gasoline prices in 2010 is 0.16, while 1991 to 2010 is 0.66.
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= 114.96) shows the overidentifying restriction is not valid. Above all, the estimates for logged
MPG are not statistically significant. The results for regression show that the IV approach is
not valid in our study using PSID.
Results from other definitions of the rebound effect are shown in Table 4.4. The estimates
of the rebound effect lie in the range of 0.61 to 0.64 for definition 2, 0.61 to 0.73 for definition
3, and 0.67 to 0.76 for definition 4. All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.
For the results of the estimation based on definition 1, our estimates for other definitions are
generally larger than the estimates in prior studies even though these fall in the wide range of
the previous literature, except definition 4.12
Another issue in the estimation of the rebound effect is the different behaviors between the
households who own single vehicle and more than one vehicle. Tables 4.5 and 4.7 present the
estimates from samples including households with only one vehicle, and Tables 4.6 and 4.8 are
the results from the multi-vehicle holding household sample. Since households with more than
one vehicle can increase their use of their more efficient vehicle when the gasoline prices rise,
they can more easily maintain the VMT, even with higher gasoline prices. In other words, the
elasticity of VMT to gasoline price for households with multi-vehicles should be lower than
households with a single vehicle. Our results are consistent with this intuition and the results
from prior studies [Zia Wadud et al. (2010); Frondel et al. (2012)].
Finally, we include interaction terms by income decile in fuel economy or price variables
of equation 4.5 and 4.6 to investigate the heterogeneous responses to the changing prices or
fuel efficiency across the income distribution, as West (2004). Table 4.9 presents the results of
the heterogeneous rebound effect across income groups according to the definitions and models.
The last three rows show test statistics for the hypothesis that the response to the change of fuel
economy (definition 1), per-mile operating cost (definition 2), and gasoline prices (definitions 3
and 4) are the same between low (1st, 2nd, and 3rd decile) and high (8th, 9th, and 10th decile)
income household. Our test results reject the equivalence of the coefficient for low income
households with high income households in most cases. These results are consistent with prior
12As shown in Table 4.1, the estimates from other studies are 0.22 to 0.87 for definition 2, 0.03 to 0.90 for
definition 3, and 0.23 to 0.70 for definition 4.
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studies, which show the low income households respond more intensely to gasoline prices than
high income households [Zia Wadud et al. (2010); West (2004)]. The estimates for definition 3
and 4 show the same patterns, which low income households reveal a higher rebound effect than
high income households. On the other hand, the rebound effect in definitions 1 and 2 is lower
for low income households. The intuitive reason why elasticities of fuel economy (definition 1)
and per-mile operating cost (definition 2) show opposite patterns to gasoline price elasticities
(definitions 3 and 4) is, in the long-run, high income households can change their vehicles into
more efficient ones when they need to drive more. However, it is not easy for low income
households, due to budget limit.
4.6 Conclusion
The policy-makers in the United States have adopted Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) rather than other policies, particulary
gasoline tax. The reason they adhere to CAFE standards may be more politically expedient.
Moreover, they argue the CAFE standards can be more effective than increasing gasoline prices
to reduce gasoline consumption because consumers undervalue the gasoline costs they will pay
later, relative to the vehicle prices they pay now, the so-called ‘energy paradox’. However,
people who oppose CAFE standards, many economists, assert increasing fuel efficiency raises
driving miles, known as the rebound effect, while higher gasoline prices work to reduce driving
for all vehicles. Although several studies investigate the rebound effect, the results are not
consistent. In other words, the rebound effect in the literature has a wide range.
To estimate the rebound effect, i.e., the elasticity of fuel economy to VMT, one concern
is to control the endogeneity of the fuel economy variable possibly correlated with household
and vehicle unobserved variables. This paper adopts panel estimation using the panel study
of income dynamics (PSID) to control unobserved household characteristics. Our preferred
estimate, fixed effects model, is 0.56 - larger than those of recent other studies even though
it lies within the range commonly accepted in the literature. Additionally, panel data have
more variations, time and spatial, in gasoline prices compared with cross-section data, which
have only spatial variations. Sufficient variations allow accurate estimation in gasoline price
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elasticity. While recent studies using cross-section data show that the gasoline price elasticity
is relatively small and not statistically significant, we find that the gasoline price elasticity
is statistically significant and larger than fuel economy elasticity. An additional reason the
estimates in the literature have a huge range is that several different empirical definitions are
used with an assumption the impact of gasoline prices on VMT are the same as fuel economy.
We estimate the rebound effect based on various definitions. The range of the rebound effect
across definitions in fixed effects model is from 0.41 to 0.67, which is not as wide as the estimates
in prior studies. Furthermore, our test cannot reject the hypothesis which both gasoline price
and fuel economy have same effects on VMT. Finally, we test the difference of response to the
change of gasoline price or fuel economy by income decile as well. We find evidence that low
income households are more reactive to a change in gasoline prices; whereas, less sensitive to
changes in fuel economy.
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Table 4.1 The Estimates of Rebound Effect in the Recent Literature
Type of elasticity Study Data Method Estimates
Definition 1 Frondel et al. (2012) Germany Household level RE 0.42
ηµ(VMT) Panel (1997-2009)
Linn (2013) U.S. Household level IV 0.44
Cross-sectional (2001)
Definition 2 Small and van Dender (2007) U.S. State-level 3SLS SR: 0.05
ηpM (VMT) Panel (1966-2001) LR: 0.22
Frondel et al. (2012) Germany Household level RE 0.46
Panel (1997-2009)
Bento et al. (2009) U.S. Household level Structural 0.74
Cross-sectional (2001)
West (2004) U.S. Household level Structural 0.87
Cross-sectional (1997)
Definition 3 Frondel et al. (2012) Germany Household level RE 0.90
ηµ(GasolineDemand) Panel (1997-2009)
Bento et al. (2009) U.S. Household level Structural 0.35
Cross-sectional (2001)
Hughes et al. (2008) U.S. Aggregate OLS 0.21-0.34
Time series (1975-1980)
Hughes et al. (2008) U.S. Aggregate OLS 0.03-0.08
Time series (2001-2006)
Definition 4 Frondel and Vance (2013) Germany Household level FE 0.46
ηpgas(VMT) Panel (1997-2009)
Frondel and Vance (2013) Germany Household level RE 0.70
Panel (1997-2009)
Bento et al. (2009) U.S. Household level Structural 0.34
Cross-sectional (2001)
Roth (2013) U.S. Household level Structural 0.45
Cross-sectional (2001, 2009)
Spiller (2013) U.S. Household level Structural 0.62
Cross-sectional (2001, 2009)
Gillingham (2013) Vehicle level IV 0.23
Cross-sectional (2001-2009)
Notes: RE=Random Effect Model, FE=Fixed Effect Model, IV=Instrumental Variable Regression, SR: Short-
Run, LR=Long-Run
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Family Size 2.80 2.75 2.70 2.69 2.69 2.67 2.67
(1.43) (1.43) (1.42) (1.40) (1.42) (1.43) (1.42)
Age of Head 43.12 43.80 44.02 44.19 44.28 44.83 46.40
(14.59) (14.98) (15.08) (15.37) (15.43) (15.46) (15.19)
Number of Adults 1.84 1.84 1.83 1.83 1.82 1.82 1.83
(0.67) (0.69) (0.71) (0.70) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
Income ($2010) 77,692 79,305 75,193 77,797 75,448 76,835 74,941
(90,872) (92,831) (105,891) (125,221) (74,474) (113,592) (82,400)
VMT (1000miles) 20.23 19.61 17.87 17.83 17.04 18.02 15.54
(16.46) (19.67) (14.91) (14.20) (13.48) (15.98) (12.18)
Fuel Economy(MPG) 20.28 20.17 19.98 19.92 19.93 20.08 20.26
(3.16) (3.42) (3.42) (3.56) (3.64) (3.78) (4.02)
Gasoline Price($/Gallon) 1.09 1.57 1.63 2.28 2.94 2.28 3.77
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.26) (0.28) (0.32)
Number of Vehicle Per HH 1.71 1.73 1.74 1.71 1.74 1.73 1.69
(0.68) (0.69) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.70) (0.68)
Households with 1 Vehicle 42.1% 41.3% 40.9% 42.1% 40.7% 41.5% 43.0%
Households with 2 Vehicle 45.0% 44.5% 44.6% 45.0% 44.4% 43.8% 44.6%
Households with 3 Vehicle 12.9% 14.1% 14.5% 12.9% 15.0% 14.7% 12.4%
Observations 4,444 5,030 5,452 5,514 5,697 5,865 5,011
The standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 4.3 The Estimates of Rebound Effect From Definition 1(Full Sample)
OLS RE FE IV RE with IV FE with IV
Dependent Var. ln(VMT)
ln(MPG) 0.543*** 0.527*** 0.556*** -0.429 -0.325 -1.049
(0.088) (0.060) (0.114) (0.641) (0.696) (0.807)
ln(Fuel Price) -0.782*** -0.714*** -0.671*** -0.721*** -0.700*** -0.599***
(0.093) (0.063) (0.106) (0.097) (0.069) (0.101)
ln(Income) 0.096*** 0.081*** 0.046** 0.092*** 0.079*** 0.050***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Age of Head -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family Size 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.021 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.012
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Number of Adults 0.135*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.090*** 0.109***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025)
Number of Vehicles 0.814*** 0.710*** 0.593*** 0.566* 0.597** 0.224
(0.200) (0.158) (0.188) (0.292) (0.249) (0.278)
High School -0.035 0.004 0.025 0.002
(0.041) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032)
Some College 0.064 0.088*** 0.099** 0.090***
(0.041) (0.030) (0.040) (0.031)
Bachelor 0.047 0.057* 0.082* 0.068*
(0.045) (0.033) (0.043) (0.035)
Graduate 0.077* 0.090*** 0.137** 0.112***
(0.047) (0.035) (0.053) (0.040)
Female Head -0.014 -0.060** 0.018 -0.028
(0.034) (0.024) (0.036) (0.031)
Vehicle Class F.E. X X X X X X
CitySize F.E. X X X X
Year F.E. X X X X X X
Vehicle Age F.E. X X X X X X
H0 : β1 = −β2a 3.60* 4.57 0.55 3.53 2.30 4.16**
a The test statistics for the hypothesis are reported in the last row.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at the 10%,
** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
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Table 4.5 The Estimates of Rebound Effect (Single Vehicle Household)
OLS RE FE IV RE with IV FE with IV
Dependent Var. ln(VMT)
ln(MPG) 0.547*** 0.483*** 0.711*** -0.343 -0.334 -2.736**
(0.135) (0.095) (0.221) (0.844) (0.876) (1.342)
ln(Fuel Price) -0.774*** -0.742*** -0.793*** -0.687*** -0.722*** -0.797***
(0.165) (0.120) (0.220) (0.165) (0.116) (0.218)
ln(Income) 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.068** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.067**
(0.030) (0.019) (0.035) (0.027) (0.019) (0.034)
Age of Head -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family Size 0.075*** 0.048*** 0.048 0.065*** 0.041** 0.035
(0.019) (0.015) (0.040) (0.019) (0.017) (0.039)
Number of Adults 0.096** 0.062** 0.108* 0.092** 0.074** 0.067
(0.043) (0.030) (0.058) (0.039) (0.035) (0.059)
High School -0.030 -0.031 0.004 -0.030
(0.069) (0.049) (0.062) (0.048)
Some College 0.078 0.059 0.087 0.061
(0.072) (0.050) (0.066) (0.053)
Bachelor 0.062 0.027 0.101 0.043
(0.080) (0.055) (0.071) (0.057)
Graduate 0.154* 0.099* 0.186** 0.133*
(0.083) (0.059) (0.089) (0.072)
Female Head -0.016 -0.026 0.027 -0.001
(0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (0.041)
Vehicle Class F.E. X X X X X X
CitySize F.E. X X X X
Year F.E. X X X X X X
Vehicle Age F.E. X X X X X X
H0 : β1 = −β2a 1.22 2.91* 0.07 1.60 1.41 6.61**
a The test statistics for the hypothesis are reported in the last row.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by household, and * denotes significance at the 10%,
** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%, respectively.
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Table 4.6 The Estimates of Rebound Effect (Multi-Vehicle Households)
OLS RE FE IV RE with IV FE with IV
Dependent Var. ln(VMT)
ln(MPG) 0.520*** 0.584*** 0.576*** 1.855*** 1.271* 1.083
(0.090) (0.066) (0.113) (0.709) (0.715) (0.831)
ln(Fuel Price) -0.809*** -0.666*** -0.572*** -0.770*** -0.710*** -0.538***
(0.091) (0.062) (0.092) (0.099) (0.074) (0.091)
ln(Income) 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.051*** 0.140*** 0.095*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
Age of Head -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family Size 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.012 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.022
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Number of Adults 0.140*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.049* 0.065*** 0.045**
(0.026) (0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022)
Number of Vehicles -0.001 -0.048 -0.095 0.620 0.191 0.057
(0.367) (0.245) (0.203) (0.514) (0.382) (0.294)
High School -0.021 0.007 -0.018 0.008
(0.040) (0.032) (0.041) (0.030)
Some College 0.063 0.085*** 0.056 0.080***
(0.038) (0.032) (0.040) (0.030)
Bachelor 0.038 0.050 0.017 0.036
(0.043) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035)
Graduate 0.025 0.071* -0.002 0.047
(0.046) (0.039) (0.052) (0.038)
Female Head -0.023 -0.048* -0.048 -0.058*
(0.038) (0.029) (0.040) (0.030)
Vehicle Class F.E. X X X X X X
CitySize F.E. X X X X
Year F.E. X X X X X X
Vehicle Age F.E. X X X X X X
H0 : β1 = −β2 4.8** 0.83 0.00 2.62 0.67 0.46
t statistics are reported in parentheses and * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1%,
respectively.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation consists of three independent studies that focus on welfare measurement,
causation of addition emission, and effectiveness of policy in environmental economics. The
first study proposes a new framework to solve the failure of convergent validity assumption
in combining RP and SP. The second and third studies estimate the factor and magnitude of
interesting variables to influence the choice of vehicle and its usage using the panel study of
income dynamics (PSID) data.
The first study examines the method to combine revealed preference (RP) and stated prefer-
ence (SP) data. Even though combining RP and SP data is recently very common in nonmarket
valuation literature, several studies have reported the critical assumption, convergent validity,
is often rejected. Therefore, prior studies have chosen using either combining two data sources
or one source, according to the result of the convergent validity assumption. The goal for this
study is to propose an alternative framework that allows for possible divergence among indi-
viduals in terms of the consistency between their RP and SP responses. The empirical results
suggest that somewhat less than half the sample exhibits inconsistent preferences. Welfare es-
timates in our proposed latent model are significantly different with a conventional combining
model and single class model.
The second study examine the interesting link between obesity and gasoline consumption.
Even though there are several studies to explore the relationship between obesity and gasoline
consumption, the literature relies on aggregate data or focuses on either the choice of fuel econ-
omy or usage. These approaches can lead to wrong conclusions, due to omitted variable bias
from unobserved household characteristics and partial effects in either fuel economy or VMT.
With unique household level data contained with the vehicle information, gasoline consump-
tion, body mass index (BMI), and other household characteristics, we estimate the impact of
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obesity through both reduced- and structural-form models. To solve omitted variable bias and
endogeneity problems, we adopt the fixed effects model and instrumental variable approaches
as the reduced-form approach, and joint discrete and continuous model as the structural-form
approach. Our findings show that the comprehensive impact of obesity and overweight on gaso-
line consumptions is little or ambiguous in contrast to the results of prior studies considering
either driving or vehicle choices.
The third study visits the very classical and controversial issue in energy economics. There
are numerous studies to estimate the rebound effect in vehicle usage or gasoline consumption.
The range of estimates of the rebound effect in the literature is very wide, 0.03 to 0.9. The
effectiveness of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, a primary policy to
reduce gasoline consumption in the U.S., largely depends on the size of the rebound effect.
The difficulty of estimating the rebound effect is how to deal with the endogeneity of fuel
economy. There are several approaches to solve endogeneous variables such as instrumental
variable regression. However, even though good instruments are difficult to find and using
panel data is a possibly good strategy, there is no study using U.S. panel data. This study
adopts the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) - not used in the literature. Our results
show that 1% increase in fuel prices or fuel economy (MPG) leads to a 0.41% to 0.67% increase
in driving miles. Moreover, this study shows that the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
with respect to both fuel economy and fuel price to be statistically significant. In addition,
we find that low income households are more responsive to changes in gasoline prices, but less
sensitive to changes in fuel economy.
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1 Generated Data Experiments - Model 2 Parameter Estimates
TRUE TRUE N=200 N=500 N=1000
Parameter s values Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
βRP
0.10 -1.20 -1.15 -1.30 -1.02 -1.14 -1.25 -1.04 -1.15 -1.26 -1.05
0.25 -1.20 -1.12 -1.25 -0.98 -1.11 -1.23 -0.99 -1.11 -1.27 -1.00
0.50 -1.20 -1.15 -1.37 -0.96 -1.14 -1.31 -1.02 -1.14 -1.32 -1.00
0.75 -1.20 -1.33 -1.60 -1.11 -1.32 -1.53 -1.17 -1.33 -1.52 -1.18
0.90 -1.20 -1.61 -1.91 -1.39 -1.61 -1.79 -1.44 -1.61 -1.79 -1.44
βSP
0.10 -0.60 -0.61 -0.66 -0.57 -0.61 -0.66 -0.58 -0.61 -0.64 -0.58
0.25 -0.60 -0.63 -0.71 -0.58 -0.63 -0.68 -0.59 -0.63 -0.66 -0.59
0.50 -0.60 -0.66 -0.73 -0.61 -0.66 -0.73 -0.61 -0.66 -0.71 -0.62
0.75 -0.60 -0.72 -0.80 -0.65 -0.72 -0.78 -0.67 -0.72 -0.77 -0.67
0.90 -0.60 -0.77 -0.83 -0.71 -0.76 -0.82 -0.73 -0.76 -0.80 -0.73
γRP
0.10 -0.70 -0.77 -0.86 -0.70 -0.77 -0.84 -0.72 -0.77 -0.83 -0.72
0.25 -0.70 -0.89 -1.06 -0.79 -0.89 -1.02 -0.80 -0.89 -0.97 -0.81
0.50 -0.70 -1.17 -1.37 -0.99 -1.17 -1.37 -1.01 -1.17 -1.32 -1.01
0.75 -0.70 -1.68 -2.02 -1.33 -1.65 -1.92 -1.41 -1.66 -1.88 -1.45
0.90 -0.70 -2.26 -2.70 -1.83 -2.26 -2.55 -1.99 -2.24 -2.46 -2.01
γSP
0.10 -0.50 -0.55 -0.63 -0.49 -0.55 -0.60 -0.51 -0.55 -0.58 -0.52
0.25 -0.50 -0.63 -0.72 -0.55 -0.63 -0.71 -0.58 -0.62 -0.67 -0.58
0.50 -0.50 -0.77 -0.91 -0.69 -0.77 -0.86 -0.69 -0.77 -0.84 -0.71
0.75 -0.50 -0.95 -1.09 -0.85 -0.95 -1.02 -0.86 -0.95 -1.03 -0.89
0.90 -0.50 -1.09 -1.19 -1.01 -1.09 -1.16 -1.03 -1.09 -1.13 -1.05
ρRP
0.10 -1.80 -1.61 -1.77 -1.47 -1.61 -1.73 -1.49 -1.61 -1.67 -1.52
0.25 -1.80 -1.38 -1.52 -1.22 -1.38 -1.48 -1.26 -1.37 -1.45 -1.28
0.50 -1.80 -1.10 -1.24 -0.93 -1.09 -1.19 -0.95 -1.08 -1.17 -0.99
0.75 -1.80 -0.91 -1.00 -0.79 -0.89 -0.98 -0.80 -0.89 -0.97 -0.82
0.90 -1.80 -0.83 -0.90 -0.74 -0.82 -0.88 -0.75 -0.82 -0.87 -0.78
ρSP
0.10 -0.40 -0.39 -0.43 -0.35 -0.39 -0.41 -0.37 -0.39 -0.40 -0.37
0.25 -0.40 -0.37 -0.41 -0.33 -0.37 -0.40 -0.34 -0.37 -0.39 -0.34
0.50 -0.40 -0.34 -0.39 -0.30 -0.34 -0.37 -0.31 -0.34 -0.36 -0.32
0.75 -0.40 -0.33 -0.38 -0.28 -0.33 -0.35 -0.30 -0.33 -0.35 -0.31
0.90 -0.40 -0.32 -0.36 -0.29 -0.32 -0.35 -0.30 -0.32 -0.34 -0.31
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Table A.2 Generated Data Experiments - Model 3 Parameter Estimates
TRUE TRUE N=200 N=500 N=1000
Parameter s values Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ω
0.10 0.40 0.33 0.24 0.42 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.39
0.25 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.46 0.38 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.44
0.50 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.52 0.45 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.51
0.75 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.53
0.90 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.49
β
0.10 -2.00 -1.81 -2.60 -1.36 -1.79 -2.46 -1.34 -1.79 -2.43 -1.36
0.25 -2.00 -1.61 -2.23 -1.23 -1.59 -2.20 -1.23 -1.58 -2.16 -1.25
0.50 -2.00 -1.44 -1.94 -1.14 -1.42 -1.80 -1.15 -1.42 -1.77 -1.14
0.75 -2.00 -1.50 -1.80 -1.19 -1.47 -1.69 -1.26 -1.48 -1.71 -1.28
0.90 -2.00 -1.71 -1.95 -1.41 -1.69 -1.86 -1.49 -1.69 -1.84 -1.53
γ
0.10 -3.00 -0.96 -1.13 -0.80 -0.97 -1.15 -0.80 -0.97 -1.14 -0.79
0.25 -3.00 -1.09 -1.27 -0.89 -1.09 -1.28 -0.91 -1.08 -1.29 -0.90
0.50 -3.00 -1.36 -1.57 -1.16 -1.36 -1.60 -1.14 -1.35 -1.59 -1.14
0.75 -3.00 -1.83 -2.22 -1.51 -1.81 -2.07 -1.55 -1.82 -2.05 -1.61
0.90 -3.00 -2.36 -2.77 -1.98 -2.36 -2.62 -2.08 -2.35 -2.54 -2.11
ρ
0.10 -0.80 -1.40 -1.68 -1.17 -1.40 -1.62 -1.22 -1.39 -1.61 -1.23
0.25 -0.80 -1.17 -1.38 -0.97 -1.16 -1.34 -1.00 -1.16 -1.33 -1.03
0.50 -0.80 -0.91 -1.05 -0.75 -0.90 -1.03 -0.78 -0.90 -1.01 -0.79
0.75 -0.80 -0.79 -0.89 -0.67 -0.78 -0.85 -0.68 -0.78 -0.84 -0.70
0.90 -0.80 -0.77 -0.85 -0.69 -0.77 -0.82 -0.70 -0.77 -0.82 -0.70
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Figure B.1 Spurious regression: Rate of Obesity and Driving
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Table B.1 Full Estimates of Structural Model
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
α parameter
Vehicle Age #1 2.24 0.02 2.16 0.03 2.20 0.03 2.23 0.03 1.95 0.04 1.92 0.04
Vehicle Age #2 2.28 0.02 2.18 0.03 2.23 0.04 2.20 0.02 1.95 0.04 1.93 0.04
Vehicle Age #3 2.27 0.02 2.18 0.02 2.22 0.03 2.21 0.02 1.97 0.04 1.96 0.04
Vehicle Age #4 2.25 0.02 2.16 0.02 2.21 0.04 2.21 0.02 1.95 0.04 1.95 0.03
Vehicle Age #5 2.22 0.02 2.13 0.02 2.19 0.04 2.19 0.03 1.94 0.04 1.95 0.04
Obesity 0.18 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.29 0.01
Obesity*(WB/100) -0.09 0.02 -0.32 0.01 -0.25 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.20 0.01
Overweight -0.23 0.02 -0.35 0.03 -0.28 0.03 -0.19 0.01 -0.26 0.02 -0.28 0.02
Overweight*(WB/100) 0.21 0.01 0.32 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.27 0.01
HP/WT 0.15 0.03 -0.20 0.02 0.41 0.03 -0.41 0.02 0.86 0.03 -0.09 0.03
(HP/WT)*(Head Age/100) 0.01 0.06 -0.31 0.02 -1.12 0.05 0.95 0.02 0.30 0.04 0.17 0.03
# of Adults 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.02
β -0.62 0.06 -0.82 0.08 -0.78 0.06 -1.20 0.08 -1.19 0.06 -1.05 0.04
λ -7.29 0.13 -6.86 0.13 -7.01 0.08 -7.23 0.08 -6.60 0.06 -7.14 0.09
τ Parameter
Midsize -1.81 0.06 -0.49 0.02 -0.44 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.55 0.04 0.38 0.03
Fullsize -0.16 0.04 -0.77 0.04 -0.39 0.03 -0.94 0.02 -0.79 0.04 0.23 0.02
Luxury Car -0.67 0.03 -0.81 0.03 -1.77 0.06 -1.21 0.02 -1.90 0.06 -0.85 0.02
Small SUV 0.24 0.04 0.43 0.03 -0.54 0.02 -0.90 0.05 0.37 0.03 -0.06 0.03
Large SUV 0.74 0.03 -0.23 0.03 -0.33 0.04 0.52 0.06 0.42 0.03 1.18 0.05
Small Truck -0.32 0.03 -0.81 0.07 -1.93 0.03 -0.37 0.03 -1.94 0.04 0.56 0.03
Large Truck -0.07 0.03 -0.60 0.06 -0.48 0.05 0.56 0.03 -0.21 0.02 1.13 0.03
Minivan -0.67 0.03 1.59 0.04 -0.25 0.03 -0.21 0.03 0.24 0.04 0.49 0.03
European -0.54 0.06 0.78 0.03 1.27 0.04 1.37 0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.37 0.05
Asian 0.08 0.04 -0.88 0.04 1.30 0.05 1.91 0.06 -0.11 0.03 -0.49 0.03
Vehicle Age #1 -1.23 0.03 0.63 0.05 0.76 0.06 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.52 0.02
Vehicle Age #2 0.68 0.04 -0.62 0.02 0.48 0.07 -0.29 0.03 0.11 0.06 -1.16 0.05
Vehicle Age #3 -0.55 0.03 -0.31 0.02 -0.18 0.02 0.63 0.03 -0.59 0.05 -0.70 0.02
Vehicle Age #4 0.76 0.03 -0.72 0.02 0.29 0.03 -1.00 0.05 -0.26 0.02 0.03 0.03
WT/100 -2.91 0.03 -4.08 0.02 -4.11 0.03 -3.72 0.03 -3.88 0.05 -4.46 0.04
WB/100 0.74 0.08 -0.22 0.03 -0.87 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.70 0.03
HP/WT -1.39 0.07 0.56 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.65 0.02 -1.00 0.02 -0.05 0.03
ϕ parameter
(Head Age/100) 0.12 0.03 -1.28 0.06 -1.75 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.74 0.06 -1.22 0.07
College Degree of Head 0.50 0.03 -1.23 0.04 1.15 0.03 -0.38 0.03 1.06 0.03 -1.01 0.05
MSA < 250k -0.13 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.58 0.02 -0.58 0.03 0.59 0.02 0.10 0.03
250k ≤ MSA < 500k -0.74 0.05 -0.35 0.03 1.02 0.02 0.90 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.76 0.03
500k ≤ MSA < 1m 0.08 0.04 -0.29 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.77 0.03 0.10 0.03 1.30 0.05
1m ≤ MSA < 3m -0.52 0.03 -0.11 0.03 -1.22 0.05 0.63 0.02 -0.49 0.02 -0.69 0.04
MSA geq 3m -1.21 0.04 -1.39 0.03 0.75 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.37 0.03 -0.68 0.03
µ 7.83 0.10 7.85 0.12 7.72 0.07 7.97 0.09 7.60 0.10 7.91 0.08
σ -1.34 0.05 -1.58 0.08 -1.56 0.06 -1.65 0.07 -1.54 0.07 -1.45 0.07
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
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Figure C.1 Density of Gasoline Price 1991-2010 vs 2010
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Data Sources
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID): http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu
– Household characteristics such as income, age of head, family size and others.
– The PSID publicly provides state-level address and manufacturer, make, broad type,
and model year on vehicle each household owns.
– In this paper, we use MSA-level address and specific vehicle models under conditions
of a restricted use contract.
• EPA fuel-economy: http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml
• WARDS Automotive Year Book: http://wardsauto.com/subscriptions/auto-yearbook
• American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association’s Regional Cost of Living Index
(ACCCRA) http://www.coli.org/
• EIA Unleaded Regular Gasoline Price, U.S. City Average Retail Prices
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#prices
Data Construction
• Based on address reported in PSID data, we merge the household characteristics with
gasoline prices (unleaded regular prices including taxed) in ACCRA cost of living index.
• Unfortunately, ACCRA gasoline prices does not cover MSAs, for the missing observations,
we impute them using EIA state-level gasoline prices.
• Using the specific model shown in PSID, we merge MPG from EPA. However, EPA
fuel economy data include from 1984. For prior models, we apply WARDS Automotive
Yearbook.
• We impute missing observations by regression technique.
